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BRANDED PREPAID CARDS
Todd J. Zywicki∗
Abstract
One of the fastest growing sectors of the consumer payments
marketplace is the general-purpose reloadable prepaid card sector. Their
importance accelerated as a consequence of new regulations enacted in
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. This increased use of prepaid
cards also increased angst among regulators, especially regarding the
number and size of fees on prepaid cards. State and federal regulators as
well as Congress are interested in imposing new regulations on prepaid
cards. These calls for regulation, however, proceed in a largely fact-free
environment. This Article describes the current economic and
regulatory landscape for prepaid cards. The market appears robustly
competitive—in recent years, costs declined, functionality increased,
and major players such as American Express and several large banks
entered the market. In addition, traditional consumer protection
concerns appear to be largely absent, as there is no evidence that
consumers systematically err in the cards that they choose. Absent a
demonstrable competitive market failure or systematic consumer abuse,
prescriptive regulation of the terms and substance of prepaid cards
would likely have unintended consequences that would exceed benefits
to consumers. On the other hand, there are some regulations that, if
enacted, could promote competition and consumer welfare in this
rapidly evolving market.
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INTRODUCTION
The general-purpose network branded prepaid card sector is one of
the fastest growing segments of the consumer banking sector. While
retail banking operations shrank in response to the 2008 financial crisis
and the recession and regulatory responses that followed, the market for
prepaid cards grew rapidly, in large part to fill the niche opened up by
the retrenchment of the traditional retail banking sector. Moreover,
although prepaid cards traditionally catered to low-income consumers,
prepaid card usage is rapidly becoming mainstream, as reflected by the
entry of retail financial stalwarts such as American Express, JPMorgan
Chase, U.S. Bancorp, and BB&T.1 Prepaid cards are rapidly recognized
as a mainstream consumer payment system, like debit and credit cards.2
This Article will examine the economics and government regulation
of network branded general-purpose reloadable prepaid (GPR) cards.
Network branded prepaid cards are those processed by major payment
network brands such as Visa, MasterCard, Discover, and American
1. Gary Fields & Maya Jackson-Randall, Footnote to Financial Crisis: More People
Shun the Bank, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2012, 2:54 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000
872396390444443504577601283142758856.
2. A fourth front for payments is mobile banking. Although nascent at the time of
writing this Article, it seems likely that mobile banking will grow in popularity over time,
providing a simplified low-cost platform to combine electronic payment capabilities with some
traditional banking services. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CONSUMERS
AND MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 17–18 (2012).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss5/2

2

Zywicki: The Economics and Regulation of Network Branded Prepaid Cards

2013]

THE ECONOMICS AND REGULATION OF NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARDS

1479

Express, and accepted wherever those network brands are accepted, just
like a debit or credit card. As such, network branded prepaid cards offer
many of the same benefits as debit and credit cards: nearly ubiquitous
acceptance, convenience, and the ability to make electronic payments
easily, including online payments. Fundamentally, the products differ
only in the time at which the consumer actually pays. As the name
suggests, consumers load money onto a prepaid card before using it,
whereas debit cards draw money at the time of use, and credit cards
allow consumers to pay their bill after use. In appearance, prepaid cards
are identical to debit and credit cards. Many consumers value this
feature, especially lower-income consumers who often feel excluded
from the financial mainstream. In essence, prepaid cards provide
consumers with the same security, functionality, convenience, and
mainstream respectability as those products.
Prepaid cards are especially important for unbanked Americans as a
mechanism for electronic payments and as an alternative to traditional
bank accounts. Moreover, the number of unbanked consumers increased
in recent years. A 2011 survey by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) found that there were approximately 10 million
unbanked households in the United States (approximately 8.2% of all
households),3 an increase from 9 million unbanked households (7.7% of
all households) in 2009.4 Javelin Strategy and Research found that the
percentage of consumers without a checking account increased by 50%
(from 8% to 12% of the population) from 2010 to 2011.5 In addition, the
FDIC found that approximately 24 million households (20.1% of U.S.
households) were underbanked in 2011,6 an increase from 21 million
households (17.9%) in 2009.7 Rates of unbanked or underbanked
households are especially high among non-Asian minorities, lower-

3. FDIC, 2011 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED
HOUSEHOLDS 4 (2012) [hereinafter FDIC, 2011 SURVEY], available at http://www.fdic.gov/
householdsurvey.
4. FDIC, 2009 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED
HOUSEHOLDS 15 (2009) [hereinafter FDIC, 2009 SURVEY], available at http://www.fdic.gov/
householdsurvey/2009/index.html. The Federal Reserve’s 2008 Survey of Consumer Payment
Choice reported that 6% of those in the study did not have bank accounts. See Scott Schuh &
Joanna Stavins, How Consumers Pay: Adoption and Use of Payments 6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Bos. Consumer Payments Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 12-2, 2011).
5. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, PREPAID CARDS AND PRODUCTS IN 2012: ENABLING
FINANCIAL ACCESS FOR UNDERBANKED AND GEN Y CONSUMERS 9 (2012). The percentage of
consumers with a personal savings account also fell from 72% to 62% of the population. Id. at 8 fig.1.
6. FDIC, 2011 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 10.
7. FDIC, 2009 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 10. The FDIC survey defines an underbanked
consumer as one who has a checking or savings account but also uses alternative financial
services such as money orders, check cashers, payday lenders, rent-to-own stores, pawn shops,
or tax refund anticipation loans. Id.
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income households, younger households, and unemployed households.8
The growth in the number of unbanked and underbanked consumers
reflects in part the retrenchment of the retail banking industry in the
wake of the financial crisis. But it is also the unintended consequence of
several regulatory initiatives that increased the cost of bank accounts to
consumers and reduced access to debit and credit cards.9 Price controls
on debit card interchange fees, enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank
financial reform legislation and new regulatory limits on overdraft
protection, dramatically cut into banks’ bottom lines leading banks to
impose fees and limits on once free checking accounts. Banks also
tightened eligibility for free checking by either raising the mandatory
minimum balance or tying free checking to usage of other bank
products such as mortgages or car loans. According to a fall 2012
Bankrate.com study, only 39% of banks offered free checking
accounts,10 down from 45% in 2011, and down by almost half from
76% in 2009.11 Similarly, a summer 2012 survey by MoneyRates.com
found that the percentage of accounts with free checking fell to 35.3%,
down from 38.8% a year earlier, and that in 2012, only 22% of the
accounts at large banks (those with more than $25 billion in assets)
were still free.12 Meanwhile, Bankrate.com’s 2012 survey found that the
average monthly service charge on a non-interest-bearing checking
account increased 25% from 2011, to $5.48 per month, and that the
average minimum balance needed to avoid a monthly service fee rose
by 23%, to $723.02 (with some accounts requiring an average minimum
balance as high as $5,000).13
In addition to raising fees, banks reduce costs by reducing services

8. FDIC, 2011 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 5.
9. Claes Bell, ATM Fees March Upward in 2011, BANKRATE.COM (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/checking/atm-fees-march-upward-in-2011.aspx; Claes Bell,
Consumers Socked with Higher Overdraft Fees, BANKRATE.COM (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/checking/consumers-socked-with-higher-overdraft-fees.aspx.
10. Claes Bell, Checking Fees Rise to Record Highs in 2012, BANKRATE.COM (Sept. 24,
2012) [hereinafter Bell, Checking Fees Rise], http://www.bankrate.com/finance/checking/
checking-fees-record-highs-in-2012.aspx#slide=2.
11. Claes Bell, Abracadabra: Free Checking Disappears!, BANKRATE.COM (Sept. 26,
2011), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/checking/abracadabra-free-checking-disappears.aspx.
Fees for ATM withdrawals, overdrafts, and other bank fees have risen as well.
12. See Richard Barrington, Bank Fees Survey EOY 2012: Online Banks Resist Raising Fees,
MONEYRATES.COM (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.money-rates.com/research-center/bank-fees/; Becky
Yerak, Checking, ATM Fees More Common, More Costly, CHI. TRIBUNE, Aug. 13, 2012,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-13/business/chi-checking-atm-fees-rise-in-amount-beco
me-more-common-20120813_1_atm-fees-fees-and-balance-requirements-credit-un ions.
13. Bell, Checking Fees Rise, supra note 10. The report notes that because 56% of banks
offer fee waivers for signing up for direct deposit, there remain ways to preserve free checking
for many. The required minimum balance for interest-bearing checking was $6,117.80. Id.
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(such as by closing bank branches and laying off workers14) and
shedding unprofitable customers. For example, Bank of America’s CEO
stated that the bank will focus on the top 20% of its most profitable
customers and get rid of the unprofitable ones.15 JPMorgan Chase
estimated that new regulations on overdraft programs and price controls
on debit card interchange fees made unprofitable 70% of customers
with less than $100,000 in deposits, which required the bank to either
raise fees, reduce costs and services, or shed unprofitable customers.16
Just as access to banks shrank, credit cards became less available to
many consumers as a result of the Credit CARD Act of 2009. The Act
imposed new rules that directly restricted access to credit cards for
consumers under the age of twenty-one and indirectly restricted access
for many lower-income consumers.
Prepaid cards are also becoming more mainstream for middle-class
families. “Closed loop” prepaid cards, such as gift or reloadable cards
that cardholders can use with only one merchant (such as Target,
Starbucks, or Amazon.com) or with a group of related merchants (such
as Old Navy, Gap, and Banana Republic), are a staple of middle-class
shopping habits. General-purpose “open loop” prepaid cards are
becoming more common as well. For example, some parents now
provide their college-bound children with prepaid cards to access funds
and make electronic payments without the danger of incurring credit
card debt. Parents can conveniently reload the cards online and even
monitor their children’s spending and budgeting habits.17 Prepaid cards
also may prove useful for caregivers, such as a child’s nanny or an
elderly parent’s home care provider. Rather than risk misuse or require
a caretaker to account for usage after the fact, a family member can
14. See Press Release, IBC Bank, IBC Announces Branch Closings in Response to New
Banking Regulation, Stresses Commitment to Customer Service and Free Products Program
(Sept. 22, 2011), https://www.ibc.com/en-us/Newsroom/Pages/IBCAnnouncesBranchClosings
inResponsetoNewBankingRegulations,StressesCommitmenttoCustomerServiceandFreeProducts
Program.aspx; Susanna Kim, Bank of America’s Cost-Cutting Plans a Reflection of Banking
Industry’s Woes, ABC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/bank-americascost-cutting-reflects-banking-industrys-woes/story?id=17292528#.UGS9B41lTYg (noting plans
by Bank of America to fire 16,000 employees and close approximately 378 branches).
15. Claes Bell, Prepaid Debit: Oasis for Unbanked?, BANKRATE.COM (Jan. 11, 2012)
[hereinafter Bell, Prepaid Debit], http://www.bankrate.com/financing/banking/prepaid-debitoasis-for-unbanked/.
16. See Dan Fitzpatrick & David Enrich, Big Bank Weighs Fee Revamp, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 1, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020457140457725374223734718
0.html.
17. In fact, prepaid card issuers developed special prepaid card products that target
parents of college students by featuring built-in parental controls. See JAVELIN STRATEGY &
RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 27 (describing prepaid card products marketed to parents that have
parental control features and lower monthly and service fees). As noted, the Credit CARD Act
of 2009 also restricted access to credit cards by college-aged students.
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provide a caretaker with a prepaid card instead of cash, a credit card, or
a debit card. Prepaid cards enable the caregiver to access funds with
greater security and accountability.
As usage of prepaid cards grows, so does regulatory scrutiny. In
large part this scrutiny focuses on the fee structure of prepaid cards,
which some critics complain is “unfair.” Yet, there is no evidence that
prepaid cards are excessively expensive compared to relevant
alternatives. There is also no evidence that prepaid card customers
systematically fail to understand the fees and other costs of prepaid
cards in comparison to the costs of relevant alternatives. Nor is there
any other evidence of a competitive market failure (such as monopoly
power) that supports immediate, intrusive government regulation.
Instead, as the market grows, it appears robustly competitive with
minimal barriers to entry and several major entrants. The largest barrier
to competition—regulation itself, namely, the Durbin Amendment—
hampers entry by large financial institutions with truly competitive
products. Available evidence, although limited, suggests that prepaid
card customers largely understand the costs of prepaid cards as well as
relevant alternatives—such as low-balance bank accounts, check
cashers, and money orders—and choose among them rationally. Indeed,
one source of the growth in prepaid cards’ popularity is the transparency
and comprehensibility of their fees relative to those of bank accounts
and credit cards. In addition, it appears that consumers generally act
rationally in how they use their cards and in the plans they select, such
as when deciding between either monthly fee plans on one hand or pertransaction fee plans on the other. Indeed, as a testament to the
competitiveness of the prepaid card market, even as the cost of bank
accounts rose, the cost of prepaid cards fell substantially.
The analysis and conclusions presented here are tentative and subject
to revision. The prepaid card market is growing and evolving rapidly.
The market experienced substantial changes in entry, innovation, and
customer demographics in recent years. Moreover, there is little
academic study of the market. The studies discussed here are of varying
degrees of scientific validity and rigor. Many are funded or written
either by industry or consumer activist organizations and thus may
suffer from bias. This Article parses through these various studies,
assesses their credibility, draws a coherent picture of the market today,
and makes predictions about where the prepaid card market is headed.
This Article begins by describing how prepaid cards work and how
the industry is structured in comparison to debit and credit cards. Part II
describes the regulatory framework for prepaid cards. Part III examines
who uses prepaid cards and why. Part IV considers the arguments for
regulatory intervention in the market. Part V provides concluding
thoughts.
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I. PREPAID CARDS: INDUSTRY GROWTH, STRUCTURE, AND PRICING
This section discusses the recent growth in the prepaid card industry
and explains how prepaid cards are structured and priced.
A. Prepaid Card Industry Growth
Prepaid cards come in many different forms. They may serve a onetime use or establish long-term relationships, remain anonymous or
imprint consumer names, hold pre-denominated or fixed amounts, or
retain a loaded value as requested by the consumer.18 More generally,
prepaid cards are distinguished as “closed loop” or “open loop” cards.
Closed loop cards include store cards that cardholders can use only with
either the designated merchant or a group of affiliated merchants. Open
loop cards include payroll cards and general-purpose cards that
cardholders can use anywhere the network brand is accepted, just like a
credit or debit card.19
Although prepaid cards today account for only a small percentage of
all payments, recent studies indicate a growing consumer adoption rate
for reloadable prepaid cards.20 According to the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, the 2011 transaction volume was $2.141 trillion for
credit cards, $2.053 trillion for debit cards, and $57 billion for prepaid
cards.21 Between 2006 and 2009, however, prepaid cards were the
fastest growing segment of noncash payments, growing 21.5% per year
in volume and 22.9% in number of charges. In comparison, debit card
annual growth in volume was 14.8% and credit card volume declined
0.2%.22 Meanwhile, the year-to-year annual percentage growth of
dollars loaded on prepaid cards rose 40% or more each year since
2008.23 Although prepaid card use declined slightly from 2008 to 2009,
debit and credit card use declined more dramatically. Prepaid card
transactions increased as a percentage of electronic transactions during

18. CAROL R. VAN CLEEF ET AL., EMERGING TRENDS IN STORED VALUE AND PREPAID CARDS 3
(Bryan Cave ed. 2005), available at http://www.mtraweb.org/conferences/2005/VanCleef-MTRAEmerging_Trends_v3.pdf.
19. Id. at 4.
20. BRETTON WOODS, INC., ANALYSIS OF RELOADABLE PREPAID CARDS IN AN
ENVIRONMENT OF RISING CONSUMER BANKING FEES 15 (2011), available at http://brettonwoods.com/media/51f57d9869e66aa1ffff8159ffffd502.pdf.
21. What’s the Deal with Prepaid Cards? How General Purpose Reloadable Cards (GPR) Are
Growing and What’s Next, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
notice%20-and-comment/whats-the-deal%20-with-prepaid-cards/ (last visited June 3, 2013)
[hereinafter What’s the Deal with Prepaid Cards?].
22. FED. RESERVE BANK SERVS., THE 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY:
NONCASH PAYMENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006–2009, at 17 (2011), available at
http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/press/2010_payments_study.pdf.
23. What’s the Deal with Prepaid Cards?, supra note 21.
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that period.24 Since 2009, prepaid card usage grew dramatically. Some
estimate that by 2014 the total annual volume loaded onto generalpurpose reloadable (GPR) prepaid cards will reach $167 billion, up
from just $12 billion in 2007.25
According to Javelin Strategy and Research, from 2010 to 2011
debit card ownership fell 12 percentage points (from 78% to 66% of
consumers), credit card ownership fell 7 percentage points (from 74% to
67%), checking account ownership dropped 4 percentage points (from
92% to 88%), and personal savings account ownership fell 10
percentage points (from 72% to 62% of consumers).26 Javelin found that
the only major consumer financial product to grow in ownership during
that period was prepaid cards. During that time, consumer use of
prepaid cards rose by two percentage points to 13%.27 This substitution
reflects both the growing attractiveness and reduced cost of prepaid
cards, and the increased cost and reduced availability of debit and credit
cards that resulted from recently enacted regulation.
As prepaid card usage grows, its user base is broadening as well.28
According to a study by the Payment Cards Center of the Philadelphia
Federal Reserve, consumer usage of prepaid cards generally follows a
“U-shaped” pattern of distribution. Many consumers use GPR cards
infrequently and for only a short amount of time before discarding
them, while others use prepaid cards heavily and repeatedly, apparently
as a substitute for a traditional checking account.29 On average, a card is
active for six months before a cardholder discards it, but this metric
shows variation by retail channel.30 Cards purchased at retail outlets are
typically active for only two months, payroll cards are active for four
months, and GPR cards marketed through a website or a financial
institution remain active for about six months.31 Most cards distributed
through retailers are used for five or fewer purchases, and only 11% are
used more than fifty times. Cards marketed through web distributors are
used more heavily.32 According to the Philadelphia Federal Reserve
study, more than a quarter of GPR cards are used for fifty or more

24. See Kevin Foster et al., The 2009 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice 17 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Bos., Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 11-1, 2011).
25. See Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 30923 (proposed May 24,
2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005) (citing report by Mercator Advisory Group).
26. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 8 fig.1.
27. Id.
28. Bell, Prepaid Debit, supra note 15.
29. See Stephanie M. Wilshusen et al., Consumers’ Use of Prepaid Cards: A TransactionBased Analysis 20 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Payment Cards Discussion Paper, 2012).
30. Id. at 18.
31. Id. at 18–19.
32. Id. at 20.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss5/2

8

Zywicki: The Economics and Regulation of Network Branded Prepaid Cards

2013]

THE ECONOMICS AND REGULATION OF NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARDS

1485

purchase transactions.33 Purchase volumes are similarly varied by
distribution channel, as 37% of cards distributed through the Internet
have purchase volumes of more than $1,000 compared to less than 20%
of those distributed through retailers.34 Those who acquire cards via the
Internet typically reload the cards many more times than those who
acquire them from retailers.35
Cardholders can typically use prepaid cards to make purchases with
either a signature or personal identification number (PIN), by
withdrawing cash at automated teller machines (ATMs), or by
requesting cash back with purchases at grocery stores and drug stores.
Consumers can check their balances online, over the phone, or at an
ATM.36 Prepaid cards also generally offer deposit insurance and fraud
protection if consumers follow certain procedures.37 In addition,
cardholders can use prepaid cards to pay bills online, to remit funds to
foreign countries, to get cash back with purchases at grocery stores and
drug stores, and to acquire courtesy checks. Some cards also enable the
consumer to use the card like a savings account—some offer interest
rates higher than prevailing bank rates.38 Some prepaid card customers
express a desire for more cards that offer savings, direct deposit, and
credit building features.39 Others, on the other hand, prefer prepaid
cards to credit or debit cards because of prepaid cards’ anonymity, the
fact that prepaid cards are not integrated into a credit reporting system,
and because they can obtain prepaid cards without an in-depth
identification or credit check.40
Overall, prepaid card users appear satisfied with the product.
According to a National Urban League survey focused on AfricanAmerican consumers, 67% of current reloadable prepaid card owners
rate their perception of the cards as either positive or very positive

33. Id.
34. Id. at 21.
35. Id.
36. Checking one’s balance online via text message or via automated phone service is
usually free, but doing so by live operator or through an ATM usually incurs a fee.
37. There is some uncertainty, however, as to how extensive and uniform these
protections are. See discussion infra notes 255–60 and accompanying text.
38. For example, NetSpend developed a program that allows consumers to have a linked
interest-bearing savings account and to transfer funds from the savings account to the card to
make payments. See Sarah Gordon, Jennifer Romich & Eric Waithaka, A Tool for Getting By or
Getting Ahead? Consumers’ Views on Prepaid Cards 15–16 (Ctr. for Fin. Servs. Innovation,
Working Paper No. 9, 2009). News reports indicate that this savings feature is popular with
NetSpend’s customers. See Fields & Jackson-Randall, supra note 1.
39. See PEW HEALTH GRP., KEY FOCUS GROUP FINDINGS ON PREPAID DEBIT CARDS 3 (2011),
available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/FSP_12014%20Pew%20Debit
Cards_R10A-4-5-12.pdf.
40. Id. at 5.
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overall, and only 7% have a negative opinion.41 Even among former
users of prepaid cards, only 15% had a negative opinion.42 Research by
the Aite Group also found very high levels of satisfaction with prepaid
cards—73% of those surveyed responded that they were “very” or
“extremely” satisfied.43
B. Industry Structure: How Prepaid Cards Work
The prepaid card network operates similarly to other types of
electronic payment systems but with a few differences.44 The backbone
of the system is the card payment network (Visa, MasterCard, Discover,
and American Express), which processes the transactions. Like debit
and credit cards, prepaid cards also have an issuing bank which holds
the funds stored on cards.45 Because many prepaid card users do not
have traditional bank accounts, industry members devised alternative
mechanisms for distributing their cards to the public. Certain companies
facilitate fulfillment and shipment of the cards, process transactions, and
track and distribute funds held in the issuing financial institution.46 The
“program manager” provides the retail interface for the card and handles
the marketing and day-to-day operations of the card program.47
“Loading networks” are outlets located in retail stores where
cardholders can acquire a card and add value initially or later by giving
cash to a merchant.48
Cards themselves are distributed at the retail level by distributors and
marketers, such as ACE Cash Express, Walgreens, CVS, Walmart,
Kroger, Safeway, gas stations, and Western Union. These retail-level
distributors act as agents for the loading networks and provide locations
41. See LINKAGE RESEARCH & CONSULTING, INC., AFRICAN AMERICAN CONSUMERS &
RELOADABLE PREPAID CARDS: PREPAID CARDS HELP AFRICAN AMERICANS CONTROL SPENDING, AVOID
OVERDRAFT AND ACCESS THE FINANCIAL MAINSTREAM 2 (2011), available at http://www.nbpca.
com/en/Research-and-Publications/Research-Articles/NUL-Survey-Linkage-Research.aspx.
As
discussed below, this relative satisfaction with prepaid cards may also reflect a high level of
dissatisfaction with alternatives.
42. Id.
43. MADELINE K. AUFSEESER, AITE GRP., GPR CARDHOLDERS: WHO ARE THEY REALLY?
DISPELLING THE MYTHS 7 (2012), available at http://www.nbpca.org/~/media/E6E6F720492F4
E42804FED2A795D3B5A.ashx.
44. See CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, THE NONPROFIT’S GUIDE TO PREPAID CARDS 14
(2010), available at http://cfsinnovation.com/system/files/CFSI%20Nonprofit%20Guide%20to
%20Prepaid.pdf.
45. Id. at 9.
46. These include companies such as FIS, FirstData, MT&L, and FSV Payment Systems.
Id. at 18.
47. These include companies such as Account Now, Green Dot, NetSpend, and RushCard.
Id.
48. “Loading networks” include brands such as Green Dot, Western Union, MoneyGram,
Visa ReadyLink, and MasterCard rePower. Id.
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where consumers can load or reload their cards. NetSpend, one of the
largest networks, has over 100,000 loading locations in retail stores.49
Consumers can also acquire, load, and reload their cards online.
According to Javelin Strategy & Research, 48% of prepaid card users
reload online, more than any other way.50 Check cashers, such as ACE
Cash Express, which traditionally competed with prepaid cards, are now
becoming outlets for retail distribution of reloadable prepaid cards.
Some prepaid card companies, such as NetSpend and Green Dot, are
partially vertically integrated and provide several different functions in
the value and distribution chain, such as program manager, distributor,
and reloading network.
Because of the large number of players involved in the distribution and
operation of prepaid cards, prepaid cards have a more complicated supply
chain than debit and credit cards. The large number of players in the
system and the important role played by nonfinancial institutions raises
the risk of greater insolvency and security breaches for prepaid cards than
those presented by other types of payment cards.51 For example, the
system of reloading cards at tens of thousands of nonfinancial retailers
raises special problems of security, fraud, and misuse.
Prepaid cards generate several different revenue streams, including
retail fees, card fees, and interchange fees, but those revenue streams are
divided amongst many different actors. The links in the prepaid card
value chain are generally low-margin businesses in which revenue is
generated by a very large number of customers who generate multiple
small fees. Moreover, the revenue generated for the industry is shared
among the many parties along the supply chain. The fixed costs of
setting up systems and contractual relationships are relatively high and
the average ownership duration of a given card is only six months,
approximately 5% to 15% of the average length of a checking
account.52 Thus, the prepaid card companies must recoup fixed costs in
a relatively short time frame. Also, the revenues generated from any
customer are relatively low when compared to debit cards or credit
cards. Wilshusen et al. estimate that the typical prepaid card generates at
most $12 per month in revenue.53 One reason for low revenues is that
49. About NetSpend, NETSPEND, https://www.netspend.com/about_netspend (last visited
May 27, 2013).
50. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 29 fig.14. Forty-four percent
reported reloading at a merchant or retailer, 27% at a money services provider, 23% at a bank
branch, and 17% at an ATM. Id.
51. See Philip Keitel, Insolvency Risk in the Network-Branded Prepaid-Card Value Chain 3
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Discussion Paper, 2011), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/consumercredit-and-payments/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-papers/2011/D-2011-SeptemberNBPCA-Keitel.pdf.
52. Wilshusen et al., supra note 29, at 18.
53. Id. at 5.
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customers tend to be relatively young and lower income, generating a
lower volume and dollar amount of transactions than debit or credit card
users.
C. Prepaid Card Fees
The most common criticism of prepaid cards concerns fees—fees for
issuance, activation, reloading, ATM usage, and customer service.54 A
study by Pew Charitable Trusts of fifty-two prepaid card programs in
2011 found that most cards have seven to fifteen fees and that
disclosure of fees is not uniform.55 But many criticisms of prepaid card
fees are overstated or outdated. In practice, very few cards impose all
possible fees. Instead, different cards offer different mixes of fees
designed to appeal to different types of customers. For example, a
particular card might charge a higher monthly fee than its competitors
but not charge any fees for speaking to a customer service
representative or for providing a paper statement.
Moreover, the size of fees declined over time as a result of
competition and consumer choice. Consumer Reports found in a recent
survey that although activation fees used were standard fixtures in the
past, only about half of the sixteen most popular cards charge an
activation fee today. In addition, Pew’s study found, for example, that
when companies charge fees (other than activation and monthly fees,
when those fees are charged), the fees are mostly small, less than $3 and
frequently $1 or less.56 Moreover, some large card issuers, such as
NetSpend and Western Union, that previously charged activation fees
no longer do so.57 Those that continue to charge activation fees (such as
the RushCard) substantially lowered them.58 AccountNow pays a rebate
to those who activate direct deposit on their cards.59 The Bluebird
prepaid card, co-branded between American Express and Walmart in
October 2012, has no annual fee, monthly fee, or activation fee.60
The most common fee is a monthly maintenance fee, although these
54. See, e.g., CONSUMER REPORTS, PREPAIDCARDS: LOADED WITH FEES, WEAK ON
PROTECTIONS 4 (2012), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/Prepaid_Cards_Report
_2012.pdf.
55. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, LOADED WITH UNCERTAINTY: ARE PREPAID CARDS A SMART
ALTERNATIVE TO CHECKING ACCOUNTS? 2 (2012), available at http://www.pewstates.org/
uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/Pew_prepaid_report.pdf.
56. Id. at 8. For example, although nine card programs charge a fee of $1 or $1.25 when a
point-of-sale (POS) transaction is declined (depending on whether it is signature or PIN debit
that is declined), forty-three do not. Id. at 2–3.
57. See CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 54, at 5.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Robin Sidel & Andrew R. Johnson, Prepaid Enters Mainstream, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9,
2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044489730457804431383162549 2.html.
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fees are falling. Thirteen of sixteen cards surveyed by Consumer
Reports charge monthly fees ranging from $2.95 to $9.95, although six
of the thirteen cards that charge a monthly fee will waive the monthly
fee or charge a lower monthly fee if the cardholder direct deposits a
certain minimum amount each month, loads a specified amount each
month, or makes a certain minimum number of transactions each
month.61 Some cards provide consumers with the option of paying a
monthly fee (with free transactions) or instead electing a per-transaction
fee without a monthly fee.62 Most of the cards examined by Consumer
Reports charged no point-of-sale (POS) transaction fees. Very few cards
charge overdraft fees, primarily because few allow overdrafts. Some
cards, however, allow cardholders to nominally overdraft on their
accounts in some circumstances without charging any fee for doing so.63
Other than monthly fees, the amount of fees paid is substantially
under the consumer’s control and is related to how the card is used
(especially ATM use frequency), the frequency and amount of reloading
money, and the use of direct deposit.64 Pew found that fifty-one of the
fifty-two cards it examined allowed consumers to avoid loading fees by
using direct deposit. To acquire cash without paying ATM fees,
consumers can opt for cash back when making a POS PIN purchase.65
Although most cards permit customers to view their account balances
and some form of transaction history online for free, there is usually a
charge associated with obtaining a paper statement.66
Wilshusen et al. found that the distribution of fees varies according
to the distribution channel through which a consumer obtains a card. As
noted, the distribution channel appears to indicate whether the consumer
uses the prepaid card for a short-term purpose (acquired through a
retailer) or as more of a long-term bank substitute (acquired through the
Internet). As a result, the distribution of fees varies according to the
card plan chosen by the consumer and the manner of use. They find that
for GPR cards obtained through the Internet, fees such as maintenance
and origination fees comprise about 52% of the fees charged, ATM
withdrawal fees comprise 22%, and transaction and other fees (such as
those for POS transactions, balance inquiries, obtaining a paper
statement, or calling customer service) are 26%.67 For retail GPR cards,
61. CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 54, at 6.
62. Id.
63. According to the Pew study, 65% of cards disclosed that overdraft was not allowed
and a fee was not allowed. Only 10% explicitly stated that there was a fee for overdrawing and
the median fee was $15. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 55, at 21.
64. CARD HUB, PREPAID CARDS REPORT—2011 (2011), available at http://www.cardhub.
com/edu/prepaid-cards-report-2011/.
65. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 55, at 9.
66. Id.
67. Wilshusen et al., supra note 29, at 31–32, 60 fig. 5.2.
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by contrast, maintenance and origination fees comprise only 28% of
fees, ATM withdrawal fees are 17%, and the majority of fees (55%) are
for transactions and other fees.68 These different fee distributions are
consistent with the suggested pattern of use by consumers of GPR cards
for differing purposes.69 Moreover, although ATM fees are an important
component of cardholder cost, the average fee charged (ranging from
$1.50 to $2.25) is consistent with the typical foreign ATM fee ($1.65)
charged for debit card transactions in 2010.70
Fees are falling in response to competitive pressures as the market
grows and scale economies evolve. According to the Federal Reserve’s
Survey of Consumer Payment Choice, from 2008 to 2009, the
percentage of consumers that rated prepaid cards as “low cost” or “very
low cost” rose from 36% in 2008 to 45.6% in 2009.71 This increase in
the perceived affordability of prepaid cards while bank accounts became
more expensive may explain why prepaid card usage rose relative to
debit card usage during that time.72 According to NetSpend’s public
reports, the percentage of customers electing to use direct deposit is
growing as well, rising from 34% in 2010 to 41% in 2011. This increase
signals that consumers are increasingly using their prepaid cards like
bank accounts. The increase also means that more consumers are taking
advantage of the lower costs of cards that feature direct deposit.73
Growing economies of scale and increasing consumer familiarity
and competition should continue to produce declining costs over time.
For example, Green Dot is purchasing a small bank in Utah to decrease
the service fees that it pays to third parties, particularly the third-party
bank that issues Green Dot cards.74 Entry by large banks may lower
costs as well. For example, JPMorgan Chase’s Liquid card charges a
flat fee of $4.95 per month with no other fees (other than foreign ATM
fees) and provides free customer service, free access to Chase’s ATM
network, and free reloading through Chase’s branches, ATMs, or
68. Id. at 32–33, 61 fig. 5.3.
69. Payroll cards exhibit different patterns of fee activity: over half (54%) of the fees
generated by payroll cards are for ATM withdrawals and just 10% are maintenance fees. Id. at
31–32, 59 fig. 5.1.
70. Id. at 32. Pew similarly found an average ATM fee of $2.25. PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS, supra note 55, at 8. The Bankrate.com 2012 study found that the average ATM fee for
out-of-network transactions was $2.50 to the owner of the ATM and $1.57 to the customer’s
bank. See Bell, Checking Fees Rise, supra note 10.
71. Foster et al., supra note 24, at 30.
72. Id. at 30–31.
73. Press Release, NetSpend Holdings, Inc., NetSpend Holdings, Inc. Reports Fourth
Quarter Financial Results (Feb. 16, 2012), http://investor.netspend.com/releasedetail.cfm?
releaseid=649475.
74. Green Dot Buying Small Utah Bank, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 23, 2011,
4:43 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9R6MI0G0.htm.
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remote deposits by cellphone.75
II. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
As prepaid card usage grows, regulatory scrutiny increases as well,
both at the state and federal levels. Legislators animated by the sense
that the fees charged for various prepaid card services are “unfair” or
“excessive” impose new regulations on prepaid card terms and
disclosures in the name of safety and soundness or consumer protection.
A. Direct Regulation of Prepaid Cards
The Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and the implementing
regulation, Regulation E, regulate at the federal level certain prepaid
cards. For example, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and
Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act) amended the EFTA in three ways
with regard to prepaid cards. First, the CARD Act added new disclosure
requirements regarding fees for store gift cards and general-use prepaid
cards that are issued for personal and family use. Second, the CARD
Act limited the circumstances under which a card may feature an
expiration date.76 Third, the Federal Reserve Board acted under
Regulation E and imposed disclosure requirements on prepaid payroll
and government benefit cards but not general-purpose prepaid cards.
State governments also regulate prepaid cards, particularly their sale
and administration, by placing limits on expiration dates and fees,
requiring certain disclosures, and mandating cash redemption of unused
card balances. California law, for example, prohibits gift cards from
expiring, limits dormancy fees, and requires that the cards are
redeemable for cash.77 Further legislation is under consideration in
several states and Puerto Rico now as well.78 These state laws are
considered more protective of consumers than federal law. Under the
federal EFTA, state laws are preserved as long as they are not
inconsistent with the EFTA.
Congress is also considering new legislation to regulate prepaid
cards. Legislation introduced by Senator Robert Menendez (D-N.J.)
75. See Chase Liquid Prepaid Card, CARDHUB.COM, http://www.cardhub.com/d/liquidprepaid-card-684c (last visited July 18, 2013).
76. Requirements for Gift Cards and Gift Certificates, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.20(a) (2012).
77. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1749.5 (2013).
78. See H.B. 4451, 98th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2012), available at http://www.ilga.gov/
legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=4451&GAID=11&DocTypeID=HB&LegID=63812&SessionID=
84&SpecSess=&Session=&GA=98 (Illinois); Prepaid Debit Cards, Fees and Impending Regulations,
CREDITKARMA (June 22, 2012), http://blog.creditkarma.com/banking/prepaid-debit-cards-fees-andimpending-regulations (New Jersey); Puerto Rico Legislature Passes Fee Restrictions for Prepaid,
Industry Urged to Contact Gov. Immediately, PAYBEFORE.COM (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.paybefore.
com/aboutus/default. aspx?id=25438 (Puerto Rico).
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would impose new substantive and disclosure requirements on prepaid
card products.79 The legislation would, among other provisions, require
“pass-through” coverage to consumers of FDIC deposit insurance for
prepaid card accounts.80 More controversially, the legislation would
prohibit fees for a large number of card issuer services. The legislation
would, for example, prohibit the imposition of any “per-transaction” fee
for POS usage or for in-network ATM usage.81 In addition, the
legislation would prohibit prepaid card companies from imposing fees
for balance inquiries, customer service inquiries, dormancy, account
closing, or overdrafts.82 The legislation would permit reload fees only if
the financial institution provided “a reasonable alternate method for
adding value” without a fee.83 The overall effect of the legislation
would dramatically affect the market and consumers: it essentially
would ban cards priced on a per-transaction basis, and force all cards to
adopt a one-size-fits-all model of a flat monthly fee for “all you can eat”
free usage. Such legislation would negatively affect consumers who
prefer cards priced on a per-transaction basis because they use their
cards lightly and for specific reasons.84 The bill would also require the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to issue a new rule
providing a standardized disclosure format for prepaid card fees and
prices.85
Additionally, the CFPB will have both the authority to regulate the
offering and provision of “consumer financial products,” including
prepaid cards, and the authority to issue any rules that the CFPB
determines to be “necessary or appropriate” to carry out the objectives
of federal consumer financial protection laws.86 With respect to prepaid
cards, the CFPB inherited the Federal Reserve’s authority under
Regulation E to regulate prepaid cards. In addition, the CFPB is
responsible for monitoring developments in the prepaid market and
79. See Prepaid Card Consumer Protection Act of 2011, S. 2030, 113th Cong (2011).
80. Id. Unlike funds held in standard bank accounts, prepaid cards do not provide
automatic insurance for an individual’s funds loaded onto a prepaid card because the prepaid
card program manager pools all of its customers’ funds in a single account. Nevertheless, the
FDIC established procedures that banks can follow to provide “pass-through” insurance in the
name of the individual cardholder instead of the program manager that owns the pooled account.
In fact, it appears that every card program backed by a federally insured depository institution
provides pass-through deposit insurance to the individual cardholder. See discussion infra notes
250–56 and accompanying text.
81. S. 2030.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See infra notes 245–47 and accompanying text (noting that consumers
overwhelmingly choose correctly between the two different card pricing schemes).
85. S. 2030 § 3(e)(3).
86. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1958 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1002(15)(A)(v), 1022).
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determining whether to propose additional consumer protections.
Pursuant to this authority, the CFPB issued an Announcement of
Proposed Rulemaking and held a field hearing on prepaid card
regulation.87 The CFPB’s announcement asks for comments on a variety
of issues: the degree to which Regulation E should cover generalpurpose prepaid cards; how to regulate prepaid cards to promote
competition and consumer choice; and whether to mandate special
disclosures for cards that do not offer pass-through of FDIC insurance.88
In addition, the CFPB asks for comments on various features of prepaid
cards, such as overdraft protection, savings accounts, and the ability to
build credit by reporting prepaid card bill payments to credit reporting
agencies.89
New regulations imposed on bank overdraft fees beginning in 2009
are indirectly relevant to understanding the market for prepaid cards. By
limiting overdraft fees, these regulations reduce access to free checking
and consequently increase the number of unbanked consumers.
According to Evans, Litan, and Schmalensee, “within days” of the Fed’s
announcement of its new rules, banks started scaling back access to free
checking, imposing new fees, and eliminating services for consumers.90
The number of accounts eligible for free checking fell 11 percentage
points—from 76% in 2009 to 65% in 2010—a figure that translates to
approximately twenty million accounts.91 The combination of price
controls on debit card interchange fees and limits on access to overdraft
protection dramatically reduced access to free checking, swelled the
ranks of the unbanked, and in turn, increased demand for prepaid cards.
B. The Durbin Amendment
Recent regulations of debit and credit cards indirectly promoted their
substitution with prepaid cards. The Durbin Amendment to the DoddFrank financial reform legislation places price controls on debit card
interchange fees, and requires that the fees remain “reasonable and
proportional” to the card issuer’s marginal cost.92 Effective October 1,
2011, “reasonable and proportional” fees are not to exceed the sum of
twenty-one cents and “5 basis points multiplied by the value of the
87. Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 30,923 (proposed May 24,
2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. David S. Evans, Robert E. Litan & Richard Schmalensee, Economic Analysis of the
Effects of the Federal Reserve Board’s Proposed Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulations on
Consumers and Small Businesses 31 (Feb. 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1769887.
91. Id.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2) (2011).
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transaction.”93 This cut in the interchange fee rate is estimated to cost
banks over $6 billion in revenue annually. It prompted banks to recover
the loss by levying new fees on checking accounts, raising minimum
balance requirements, terminating debit card rewards programs, charging
higher out-of-network ATM fees, providing incentives to use credit and
prepaid cards, and driving away customers who are no longer profitable.94
These new higher fees will eventually push an estimated 5% of consumers
out of the mainstream banking system95 and increase the number of
unbanked consumers by 1 million.96 The Durbin Amendment will likely
adversely impact younger, less educated, and lower-income consumers the
most, especially those with lower credit scores. They will find bank
accounts more expensive, less available, and of lower quality (such as
fewer services, fewer branches, and shorter and less convenient banking
hours and locations).97 Now, some banks offer prepaid cards to consumers
when they are rejected for a checking account because they no longer
qualify in the current economic and regulatory environment.98 Even if
merchants pass on to consumers the savings from decreased debit
interchange fees, low-income consumers who either struggle to meet
minimum balance requirements or who have poor credit will likely switch
to prepaid cards to avoid these new fees.99
The average interchange fee on prepaid cards is approximately forty
cents per transaction.100 Interchange fees are an important revenue
source for prepaid cards: during the first quarter of 2011, interchange
revenue comprised 32% of operating revenue at Green Dot and 24% at
NetSpend.101 Wilshusen et al. find that interchange fees comprise about
93. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 12 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (2012).
94. Tim Chen, What the Durbin Amendment Means for You, U.S. NEWS (July 12, 2011),
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-money/2011/07/12/what-the-durbin-amendment-me ansfor-you. For example, many debit card issuers subject to the price controls eliminate rewards on debit
cards but preserve them for credit and prepaid cards. About half of prepaid card users say that the
availability of rewards on prepaid cards increases the likelihood that they would use them. See Prepaid
Cards Lure Underbanked and Gen Y Customers, JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH (Apr. 11, 2012),
https://www.javelinstrategy.com/news/1326/92/Prepaid-Cards-Lure-Underbanked-and-Gen-YConsumers/ d,pressRoomDetail.
95. BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 20, at 14.
96. Evans et al., supra note 90, at 4.
97. See Fumiko Hayashi & Joanna Stavins, Effects of Credit Scores on Consumer Payment
Choice 1, 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos. Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 12-1, 2012).
98. Elizabeth Ody, Prepaid Card Use Up 18% as Consumers Drop Debit: Study,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 11, 2012, 10:07 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/
2012-04-11/prepaid-card-use-up-18-percent-as-consumers-drop-debit-study.
99. Chen, supra note 94.
100. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 2009 INTERCHANGE REVENUE,
COVERED ISSUER COST, AND COVERED ISSUER AND MERCHANT FRAUD LOSS RELATED TO DEBIT
CARD TRANSACTIONS 8 (2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/
files/debitfees _costs.pdf.
101. Jennifer Tescher, Durbin’s Unintended Consequences for the Underbanked, AM.
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20% of issuer revenue for GPR cards and about half of revenue for
payroll cards.102 Increased marketing of prepaid cards in an effort to
switch debit card users to prepaid cards or to attract new customers may
offset 20%–50% of the losses in debit interchange revenue.103
Prepaid cards, however, are not entirely free from the Durbin
Amendment’s reach. For the purposes of 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2, “debit
card” is defined to include general-use prepaid cards, as set forth in 15
U.S.C. § 1693l-1(a)(2)(A).104 “Small issuers,”105 those with assets
below $10 billion, are exempt.106 Prepaid cards issued by banks with
more than $10 billion in assets, however, are exempt only if they do not
provide access to funds by check, Automated Clearing House (ACH), or
wire transfer. This narrow exception, which Congress intended to
prevent large banks from evading the Durbin Amendment’s price
controls by effectively converting prepaid cards into de facto debit
cards, means that large banks can only offer prepaid cards with reduced
functionality. In particular, large banks cannot offer online bill pay,
recurring ACH debit (such as to pay utility bills), or funds transfer
among different accounts (such as the transfer of funds from a prepaid
card to an interest-bearing savings account). If large banks offer these
BANKER (July 26, 2011, 6:06 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/Durbin-debitinterchange-prepaid-underbanked-1040610-1.html.
102. Wilshusen et al., supra note 29, at 6.
103. Recouping Lost Debit Interchange Fees with Prepaid Cards, AITE GROUP (Mar. 21,
2011), http://www.aitegroup.com/Reports/ReportDetail.aspx?recordItemID=770.
104. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693o-2(c)(2) defines the term “debit card” as follows:
(A) means any card, or other payment code or device, issued or approved for
use through a payment card network to debit an asset account (regardless of the
purpose for which the account is established), whether authorization is based on
signature, PIN, or other means;
(B) includes a general-use prepaid card, as that term is defined in section 1693l1(a)(2)(A) of this title; and
(C) does not include paper checks.
Id. 15 U.S.C. § 1693l-1(a)(2)(A) defines “general-use prepaid card” as follows:
[A] card or other payment code or device issued by any person that is—
(i) redeemable at multiple, unaffiliated merchants or service providers, or
automated teller machines;
(ii) issued in a requested amount, whether or not that amount may, at the option
of the issuer, be increased in value or reloaded if requested by the holder;
(iii) purchased or loaded on a prepaid basis; and
(iv) honored, upon presentation, by merchants for goods or services, or at
automated teller machines.
Id.
105. A “small issuer” includes “any issuer that, together with its affiliates, has assets of less
than $10,000,000,000.” 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(A) (2012).
106. Id. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(A)–(B).
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functions, they are subject to the Durbin Amendment’s price controls on
interchange fees. Thus, in addition to swelling the Durbin Amendment’s
ranks of the underbanked, it could also stifle the evolution of prepaid
cards into low-cost bank account substitutes for unbanked and
underbanked consumers.
Moreover, by forcing traditional banks to offer cards with reduced
functionality, the Durbin Amendment deprives consumers of potential
benefits that banks are uniquely positioned to offer. For example, when
the consumer website NerdWallet.com surveyed the prices of prepaid
cards, it found that large banks issued two of the three least expensive
cards.107 The Chase Liquid card is especially instructive: for a monthly
flat fee of $4.95, it offers free usage of Chase’s 17,000 ATMs; free
access to its 10,500 branches; free customer service with a live agent;
free reloading through ATMs, branches, or mobile banking; and even
free paper bank statements.108 Chase designed the Liquid card as an
alternative to a traditional checking account. As one review notes,
however, “[T]he Liquid card doesn’t [offer] much in the way of an
automatic online bill pay option.”109 What the review failed to note,
however, is that Chase is unable to provide Liquid with an online bill
pay feature and other similar functionalities because these features
trigger the Durbin Amendment’s interchange price controls. Notably,
American Express’s low-fee Bluebird card offers automatic bill pay—
but only because as a non-bank it is not covered by the Durbin
Amendment and can thus offer bill pay without triggering the Durbin
Amendment’s interchange price controls.110
Other exemptions from the Durbin Amendment’s reach include
reloadable prepaid cards that are either government-issued or meet the
criteria set forth in § 1693o-2(a)(7)(A)(ii), namely, that consumers
cannot use the cards to access funds held in a separate account, such as
a bank account (i.e., they are essentially not debit cards).111
107. The two cards were U.S. Bank Convenient Cash Card ($39 per year) and
ATIRAreload Card ($54 per year). Out of 82 Prepaid Debit Cards, Find the One for You,
NERDWALLET, http://www.nerdwallet.com/prepaid (last visited July 23, 2013).
108. Id.
109. Jill Krasny & Zachry Floro, Chase’s New Prepaid Card Actually Looks Like a Decent
Product, BUSINESSINSIDER (July 10, 2012, 1:24 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
reviewing-chases-new-prepaid-card-chase-liquid-2012-7.
110. See Matt Townsend, Wal-Mart Offers Bank Account Option with American Express,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 9, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-09/wal-martoffers-bank-account-option-with-american-express.html.
111. Exempt reloadable prepaid cards include those that are government-issued or in
compliance with a five-factor test. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(7)(A) (2012). Factors include any
“plastic card, payment code, or device” that is
(I) linked to funds, monetary value, or assets which are purchased or loaded on
a prepaid basis;
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Notwithstanding these exemptions, the Durbin Amendment became
effective July 21, 2011112 for interchange transaction fees charged with
respect to government-issued prepaid cards, and for § 1693o2(a)(7)(A)(ii)-compliant prepaid cards that subject the cardholder to
either of the following: (1) a “fee for an overdraft, including a shortage
of funds or a transaction processed for an amount exceeding the account
balance” or (2) a “fee imposed by the issuer for the first withdrawal per
month from an automated teller machine that is part of the issuer's
designated automated teller machine network.”113
III. THE ECONOMICS OF PREPAID CARDS: WHO USES THEM AND WHY
General-purpose prepaid cards occupy a unique position in the
payments landscape. In terms of functionality they are virtually
identical to credit cards and debit cards. Each of the three carries fees,
and in theory these products compete against one another. The primary
differences are temporal, not functional. Consumers pay for prepaid
card purchases prior to use, debit card purchases contemporaneously
with use, and credit card purchases after use.
What historically distinguished prepaid cards from debit and credit
cards was the user base, not the basic product. Prepaid card users
traditionally are unbanked as well as lower-income, less educated, less
financially sophisticated, and able to access fewer payments options
than consumers with bank accounts. For this group, the relevant
comparison is not debit and credit cards (to which they have little
access) but rather cash-based financial services that cater to unbanked
individuals, most notably check cashing and money orders. Prepaid
cards offer superior functionality, convenience, and price compared to
these alternatives.
Yet, this picture is changing rapidly as prepaid cards become
increasingly mainstream. As competition increases, fees fall and
functionality rises. Now, some consumers choose prepaid cards
(II) not issued or approved for use to access or debit any account held by or for
the benefit of the card holder (other than a subaccount or other method of
recording or tracking funds purchased or loaded on the card on a prepaid basis);
(III) redeemable at multiple, unaffiliated merchants or service providers, or
automated teller machines;
(IV) used to transfer or debit funds, monetary value, or other assets; and
(V) reloadable and not marketed or labeled as a gift card or gift certificate.
Id. § 1693o-2(a)(7)(A)(ii).
112. The exception set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(7)(B) applies “after the end of the
1-year period beginning on the effective date provided in paragraph (9).” Id. § 1693o-2(a)(9)
provides that the subsection “shall take effect at the end of the 12-month period beginning on
July 21, 2010.” See also 12 C.F.R. 235.5(d) (2012).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(7)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012).
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voluntarily over debit and credit cards.
A. Profile of Prepaid Card Customers
There is little systematic research of the demographic profile of
prepaid card customers. Historically, prepaid card users were comparable
to those who use alternative financial products generally—relatively
young, lower-income, suffering from tarnished credit, or otherwise
excluded from the mainstream financial system. But as GPR prepaid cards
are becoming more popular, they are also becoming more mainstream
demographically and are prospering in certain middle-class niches.
The unintended consequences of recent regulatory interventions are
particularly important in promoting adoption of prepaid cards by two
groups. The first group is low-income consumers who are driven out of
the banking system by new fees and other costs attributable to the
Durbin Amendment, new restrictions on overdraft protection, and the
CARD Act.114 The second group is younger consumers who, in addition
to facing many of the same limits as low-income consumers (small
average balances and an inability or unwillingness to pay new bank
fees),115 also find it much more difficult to gain access to credit cards
since the enactment of the CARD Act, which limits credit card access
for those under twenty-one.116 At the same time, the virtual
disappearance of check writing by younger consumers further promotes
a reliance on electronic payments. Finally, unique product attributes
such as parental control features open up prepaid cards to a new market
range, such as students away at college.
In one of the first studies of prepaid card customers, Rhine et al.
studied 1,917 prepaid cardholders in 2007 to examine their demographic
profiles and patterns of card usage.117 They found that prepaid card users
were young: 82% were under the age of forty-five.118 They found that
while most cardholders carried modest balances and used their cards
primarily to pay bills and make POS transactions, some appeared to use

114. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 8–10.
115. For example, according to one study, 21% of Gen Y consumers do not have a
checking account, compared to the national average of 12%. Id. at 25.
116. Id. at 8.
117. SHERRIE L.W. RHINE ET AL., THE CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, CARDHOLDER USE
OF GENERAL SPENDING PREPAID CARDS: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE MARKET 5, 18 (2007), available
at http://www.cfsinnovation.com/system/files/imported/managed_documents/general_spending
_prepaid_cards.pdf.
118. Id. at 21; see also Ronald J. Mann, Adopting, Using, and Discarding Paper and
Electronic Payment Instruments: Variation by Age and Race 14–15 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos.
Consumer Payments Research Ctr. Pub. Policy Discussion Paper No. 11-2, 2011) (finding
prepaid card users to be younger on average than debit or credit card users), available at
http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/ppdp/2011/ ppdp1102.pdf.
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them as a substitute for a traditional bank account.119 For example,
although most users reloaded their cards infrequently, 16% loaded them
twice or more a month.120 In addition, those who reloaded more frequently
loaded larger value loads on average, which suggested that they used their
cards as a substitute for a traditional bank account.121
For withdrawals, Rhine et al. found that the average value of a POS
transaction was $39.48, and funds withdrawn from ATMs averaged
$41.35 per transaction.122 The average cardholder maintained a monthly
utilization rate of 92%, which indicated that most of the funds that were
added to the account were later spent. Seventy-one percent of the funds
were used for POS transactions and 21% were withdrawn from ATMs,
suggesting that the primary usage was for electronic payments rather
than cash access.123 Those who loaded funds less frequently also tended
to have higher utilization rates and were somewhat more likely to use
their cards for POS purposes than for ATMs.124 Those who loaded their
cards more frequently (two or more times per month) made an average
of 2.2 ATM and 9.6 POS transactions per month.125 Forty-five percent
of cardholders did not access their accounts through an ATM during the
month, and 28% did so less than once per month.126 As with deposits,
those who accessed their accounts more than twice per month also
tended to make larger ATM withdrawals.127 For POS transactions, only
6% of those surveyed did not use their cards at all during a month, and
27% did so less than once per month.128 However, 14% made POS
transactions three to five times per month and 24% did so more than
five times per month.129
In 2009, Gordon, Romich, and Waithaka conducted in-depth focus
group interviews with 12 AccountNow prepaid card customers and 10
NetSpend prepaid card customers.130 They found that the typical
cardholder was low income, with a median post-tax personal income of
$17,500 for AccountNow customers and $22,100 for NetSpend
customers.131 They also found a substantial income range: The incomes
of the surveyed AccountNow customers ranged from $15,000 to
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

RHINE ET AL., supra note 117, at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Gordon, Romich & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 2, 9.
Id. at 10.
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$160,000 and the NetSpend customers’ incomes ranged from $12,000 to
$55,000.132 Additionally, the surveyed prepaid card users were
significantly less likely than the general population to own a home: only
25% of the AccountNow customers were homeowners and none of the
NetSpend customers owned their homes.133 Debt levels were significant
relative to income levels for participants in the survey: fewer than 20%
were debt-free; median debt levels were $10,000 and $8,250
respectively for AccountNow and NetSpend customers; and
AccountNow customers’ debt ranged up to $45,000 and NetSpend
customers’ debt ranged up to $175,000.134 Unpaid bills, especially
unpaid utility bills and unpaid bank fees, constituted the main source of
debt for prepaid card users.135 Over three-quarters of both AccountNow
and NetSpend customers reported unpaid utility bills and bank fees.136
These unpaid bills often led to the termination of customers’ accounts.
Credit card debt and unpaid medical bills accounted for the bulk of the
total amount of debt in dollar terms.137 Additionally, most of
NetSpend’s customers carried small balances and used their cards for
small transactions.138 The 2009 survey also found that the prepaid card
customers used their cards to pay two to three bills per month (typically
phone bills, utility bills, and car payments; they also used their cards for
online shopping).139 The survey shows that at that time, prepaid cards
were still largely an alternative financial product.
More recent studies indicate that prepaid cards are becoming more
mainstream and middle class. A study by Aite Group found that onethird of prepaid card users earn more than $45,000 per year, 34% have a
college degree or higher, and many maintain both a checking account
and a credit card.140 It found that 40% of customers surveyed used their
prepaid cards “most frequently” for POS purchases, 27% used them
most frequently for online transactions, and 24% used them most
frequently to pay bills.141 Only 9% reported using their cards most
132. Id. at 11.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 10–11.
136. Id. at 11.
137. Id. at 10–11. Speaking recently before the Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions
and Consumer Protection, NetSpend CEO Daniel Henry testified that nearly all NetSpend customers
were “working” U.S. citizens, the majority having obtained at least a high school diploma and earning
less than $50,000 per year. Examining Issues in the Prepaid Card Market: Hearing Before the S.
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. & Consumer Prot., 112th Cong. 2 (2012) [hereinafter Prepaid Card Hearing]
(statement of Daniel R. Henry, CEO, NetSpend Holdings, Inc.) (2012).
138. Gordon, Romich & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 9.
139. Id. at 17.
140. AUFSEESER, supra note 43, at 3–4.
141. Id. at 9.
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frequently at an ATM.142 The survey also found prepaid cards especially
popular among younger consumers, with 43% of prepaid card
customers being members of Generation Y at the time of the study.143
A 2012 survey by Javelin Strategy & Research of more than 3,000
Americans also found both high usage rates among unbanked and younger
consumers and growing mainstream usage.144 Javelin found young and
underbanked consumers almost twice as likely to use prepaid cards as
baby boomers.145 As noted above, Javelin found a substantial drop in the
number of consumers with debit and credit cards during that same period
the percentage of U.S. adults with prepaid cards rose from 11% to 13%.146
More than half of underbanked respondents (56%) said they used prepaid
debit cards for routine online purchases.147 Moreover, Javelin found a
dramatic rise in the percentage of the population without a checking
account. From 2010 to 2011, the percentage increased from 8% to 12%.148
But Javelin also noted an increasingly mainstream use of prepaid cards:
although 17% of those earning under $15,000 per year used prepaid or
payroll cards, the second largest group consisted of customers earning
$75,000 to $99,000 per year (16%). Additionally, 13% of those earning
over $150,000 per year owned prepaid cards in 2011.149
Javelin’s analysis suggests that a growing number of underbanked
consumers use prepaid cards like a traditional bank account.150
Underbanked prepaid card owners reload their cards more frequently,
make larger reloads than other prepaid card owners,151 and use their
cards much more frequently for POS transactions.152 NetSpend also
reports that by 2011, nearly 42% of its cardholders took advantage of
the direct deposit feature, up from only 14% in 2007.153 Also, according
to a 2012 news report, Green Dot stated that about half of its customer
base uses direct deposit.154 Wilshusen et al. also found evidence that
some consumers use prepaid cards as a substitute for a checking
account. They found that some consumers retain prepaid cards for
142. Id.
143. Id. at 3
144. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 5–6.
145. Id. at 9.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 20.
148. Id. at 9.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 14.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 22.
153. NETSPEND, 2011 NETSPEND HOLDINGS FORM 10-K 30 (2012), available at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-56BIQV/1684506713x0xS1047469-12-1472/14
96623/filing.pdf.
154. See Fields & Jackson-Randall, supra note 1.
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extended periods and use them intensely and primarily for ongoing
living expenses, rather than saving and financing large purchases.155
They also found that ATM withdrawals comprise one-third to one-half
of the value taken off the card and that the majority of POS transactions
occur at grocery stores, fast food restaurants, and gas stations. This
pattern, they concluded, “suggests that prepaid cards are used primarily
to purchase nondurable goods.”156
Other evidence points to rapid mainstreaming of prepaid card use.
Green Dot states that its median customer income is about $45,000.157
Schuh and Stavins found that adoption of prepaid cards was highest for
the highest income group in their study, those making above $100,000
per year.158 They found 26% of those with incomes above $100,000 per
year owned prepaid cards, whereas only 15% of those with incomes
under $25,000 per year or between $25,000 and $50,000 owned prepaid
cards.159 In addition, those who attended post-graduate school were
twice as likely to adopt prepaid cards (27%) as those with a high school
degree or less (13%).160 On the other hand, the data collected by Schuh
and Stavins are of insufficient granularity to fully explain these patterns
of adoption because they include both open-loop and closed-loop cards
as well as cards bought for others (although cards received from others
are treated separately). Thus the data might include prepaid cards
bought for others (such as children in college), closed-loop cards (such
as gift cards), or reloadable closed-loop cards (such as Starbucks cards).
Overall, prepaid cards traditionally aimed at low-income and
unbanked consumers remain important for those groups and seem to
grow in popularity. But more recent studies and other sources of
information indicate prepaid cards are becoming more mainstream and
that their demographic base is increasingly reaching toward middleclass consumers.
B. Prepaid Cards Versus Debit and Credit Cards
Many consumers prefer debit and credit cards to prepaid cards.
Many consumers, however, are unable to obtain or maintain a bank
account or to use a credit card responsibly. Others decide that prepaid
cards offer sufficient functionality at lower prices than traditional bank
accounts or credit cards. In particular, once the entire cost of a bank
account or credit card is taken into account, some consumers, especially
lower income consumers, may find prepaid cards less expensive. As a
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Wilshusen et al., supra note 29, at 5–6.
Id. at 6.
See Fields & Jackson-Randall, supra note 1.
Schuh & Stavins, supra note 4, at 25 tbl. 1.
Id.
Id.
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result, some consumers may rationally choose to use prepaid cards
instead of a bank account, even if they otherwise could maintain a bank
account and carry a debit or credit card. According to a 2008 survey of
2,799 underbanked and unbanked consumers, 55% of unbanked and
18% of underbanked consumers prefer to use a prepaid card to a
checking account.161 And according to another survey, a majority of
prepaid card users prefer prepaid cards to credit cards.162
Research reveals several reasons why prepaid card customers may
prefer prepaid cards over bank accounts and credit cards: cost,
alienation and distrust of the banking system, imposing self-control on
spending decisions, and the growing functionality and similarities of
prepaid cards to traditional banking products.
1. Cost
Checking accounts may prove more expensive than prepaid cards for
many consumers, especially lower income consumers who either
experienced rising bank fees in recent years or those who frequently
overdrew their accounts or bounced checks. The cost of prepaid cards
may also prove lower for consumers with certain usage patterns or who
use direct deposit (which enables the waiver of certain fees). The
Bretton Woods economic consulting firm estimates that a low-balance
bank customer who pays monthly account fees and makes five overdraft
transactions per year will pay $179 to $464 per year in bank fees,
compared to a range of $265.92 to $333.75 for prepaid cards without
direct deposit and $97.56 to $238.95 for prepaid cards with direct
deposit.163 Thus, although checking accounts may prove less expensive
for most consumers (those who do not overdraft their accounts), prepaid
cards often will prove less expensive for others, particularly those who
frequently incur overdraft fees or do not use direct deposit. This is not
to say that prepaid cards are less expensive or more expensive for every
consumer at every time, but that in light of consumer heterogeneity,
prepaid cards will prove less expensive for at least some consumers.
Accordingly, regulators should preserve the prepaid card choice and
neither favor nor disadvantage them by adopting regulatory dictates that
161. CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, PREPAID CARD VS. CHECKING ACCOUNT
PREFERENCES 1 (2008), http://cfsinnovation.com/system/files/imported/managed_documents/
prepaid_oct09_0001.pdf. Of underbanked consumers, 18.3% preferred prepaid cards to
checking accounts.
162. AUFSEESER, supra note 43, at 6 (noting that 61% of prepaid card users prefer to use
prepaid cards compared to only 33% that prefer to use credit cards).
163. BRETTON WOODS, INC., ANALYSIS OF BRANDED GENERAL PURPOSE RELOADABLE
PREPAID CARDS: A COMPARATIVE COST ANALYSIS OF PREPAID CARDS, BASIC CHECKING
ACCOUNTS AND CHECK CASHING 7 (2012), available at http://bretton-woods.com/
media/3e145204f3688479ffff832affffd524.pdf.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 2

1504

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

artificially push consumers toward debit or credit cards.
A study by Javelin Strategy and Research conducted in the spring of
2012 concluded that the annual consumer cost of maintaining a
checking account averaged between $192 and $359 per customer.164
Consumers pay about 21% more in fees for basic checking accounts
than they did six years ago. Consumers pay on average about $7.72 per
month in a combination of monthly and automated teller machine fees,
or over $92 per year.165 According to a NerdWallet.com survey, unless
certain minimum average balance or other similar conditions are met
(which is unlikely for those who use prepaid cards), the average
monthly fee for traditional checking accounts at the nation’s five largest
banks ranged from $5 to $12, and these sums do not include additional
fees that banks might assess.166 A 2012 survey by MoneyRates.com
found that fees on checking accounts rose across the board from 2011 to
2012, and included increases in the minimum deposit needed to open an
account, increases in the minimum balance needed for free checking,
and increases in average monthly maintenance fees from $12.08 to
$12.26 per month.167 A study by Barrington Research estimated that the
average checking account costs $279 per year for a typical user
compared to prepaid cards, which costs $158.168 According to a survey
of prepaid card users by Aite Group, 39% of respondents “strongly
agreed” that prepaid cards cost less than checking accounts—more than
twice the number of consumers of alternative financial services who
still had bank accounts.169 And 37% strongly agreed that prepaid cards
are “better overall” than checking accounts (compared to 15% of users
of alternative financial services who still had bank accounts).170 These
studies likely underestimate the value of prepaid cards because they
consider only the direct financial costs of bank accounts versus prepaid
cards and ignore other costs such as the “shoe leather” costs of
reloading cards at over 100,000 retail locations. These costs can prove
high, especially for those who lack convenient access to a bank branch
164. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 19.
165. See Elizabeth Ody, Regulation Fuels 21% Surge in Checking Fees, BLOOMBERG (Feb.
29, 2012, 12:54 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-29/regulation-fuels-21-surgein-bank-checking-fees-javelin-says.html (citing study by Javelin Strategy & Research).
166. See NerdWallet Bank Fee Monitor: Average Big-Bank Checking Account Can Cost
$110 a Year, NERDWALLET (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/2012/bank-feemonitor-average-bigbank-checking-account-cost-110-year.
167. See Barrington, supra note 12.
168. See David Sternman, This Small IPO Stock Could Jump as Much as 70%,
STREETAUTHORITY.COM (Sept. 15, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.streetauthority.com/growthinvesting/small-ipo-stock-could-jump-much-70-458578.
169. The Debanked: A US$1 Billion Prepaid Debit Card Opportunity, AITE GRP. (Feb. 9,
2012), http://www.aitegroup.com/Reports/ReportDetail.aspx?recordItemID=899.
170. Id.
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or whose working hours make it inconvenient to bank at a traditional
branch.171
Pew conducted an in-depth comparison of prepaid and checking
accounts and relied on a variety of assumptions about fees and
consumer sophistication. Pew concluded that there is “no uniform
answer” as to whether prepaid cards are more expensive than checking
accounts because the answer depends greatly on how consumers use the
alternative products.172 For example, examining the estimated costs for
median users of the products, Pew found that for “savvy users” a
checking account was slightly less expensive than a prepaid card ($4.50
per month for prepaid cards versus $3.99 for checking accounts).173 For
the median “basic” consumer, however, prepaid cards are less expensive
than bank accounts ($22.15 per month for prepaid cards versus $28.00
per month for checking accounts), and for “inexperienced” consumers
prepaid cards are substantially less expensive ($28.70 per month for
prepaid cards versus a $94.00 per month for checking accounts).174
According to Pew, therefore, it is difficult to generalize whether
consumers are better off with prepaid cards or checking accounts. Many
basic and inexperienced consumers will likely benefit financially from
using a prepaid card instead of a checking account.
The demographics of prepaid card users also influence the relative
superiority of prepaid cards versus bank accounts. Those who use
prepaid cards typically do not have a large amount of liquid financial
reserves that they can use to maintain a bank account in good standing.
According to Daniel Henry, CEO of NetSpend, the company’s average
customer card balance is below $100—far below the minimum balance
threshold now required by many banks to qualify for free checking.175
According to the Pew Foundation, the median minimum account
balance necessary to waive monthly fees at most banks is $2,500, a sum
that few prepaid card customers can likely meet.176
2. Alienation and Distrust of Banks
A second reason why some consumers prefer to use prepaid cards
instead of bank accounts is their alienation from and distrust of the
traditional banking system. In fact, many unbanked consumers who use
prepaid cards are so-called “debanked” consumers who previously
maintained bank accounts but abandoned them either voluntarily or
involuntarily due to cost or the inability to manage them responsibly.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Prepaid Card Hearing, supra note 137, at 3.
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 55, at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17–18.
Prepaid Card Hearing, supra note 137, at 2.
Ody, supra note 165.
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For example, of the 22 participants in the study by Gordon, Romich,
and Waithaka, all but one previously had a bank account; but by the
time they were interviewed as part of the study, 16 of 22 did not have a
conventional bank account.177 Their precise reasons for migrating out of
the traditional banking system varied, but all focused on the costs and
complexity of bank accounts: several incurred substantial overdraft or
bounced check fees, one account was closed because of a bankruptcy
filing, several complained of unexpected fees, and others claimed they
were the victims of identity theft or unauthorized account access.178 In
addition, most felt banks mistreated or ignored them in their efforts to
resolve issues. They felt alienated from and distrustful of the
mainstream banking system.179
A March 2012 study by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve found a general dislike of dealing with banks was the most
commonly cited reason for being unbanked.180 The Survey of Consumer
Finances also consistently found that the most common reason
consumers gave for being unbanked was a dislike of dealing with banks
(25% of respondents). This response rose from 22.6% of respondents in
the 2004 survey to 27.8% in the 2010 survey.181
Other studies also found unbanked customers shared a general
distrust of banks. A focus group study by the Kansas City Federal
Reserve Bank of 76 unbanked and underbanked consumers found high
levels of anger and distrust toward and feelings of disrespect from
traditional banks.182 Participants in the study especially complained
about what they experienced as “hidden” fees (such as inactivity fees
and check order charges) or excessive fees (such as overdraft fees).183 In
some cases consumers could not cope with the complexity and
177. Gordon, Romich, & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 12–13.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 12–14.
180. See BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 2, at 19.
181. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, 98 FED. RESERVE BULL. NO. 2, CHANGES IN
U.S. FAMILY FINANCES FROM 2007 TO 2010: EVIDENCE FROM THE SURVEY OF CONSUMER
FINANCES 32 (2012).
182. FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, A STUDY OF THE UNBANKED & UNDERBANKED
CONSUMER IN THE TENTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 2, 6 (2010), available at
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/research/community/Unbanked.Report.pdf.
183. Id. Note that although they considered these fees “hidden,” that is a subjective
assessment. At least some of the fees may have been unknown at the time, but others simply
reflect a lack of experience or knowledge about bank accounts. Nevertheless, they were
necessarily hidden or concealed (such as check order fees). In one case, for example, a
participant in the focus group reported that he did not realize he needed to keep money in his
account to use checks; he thought he could use checks as long as he had them in his checkbook.
Id. at 7. For purposes of the current discussion, however, it is the subjective experience of the
unbanked and underbanked consumers that matters in understanding their decision-making
process when determining whether to adopt a bank account.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss5/2

30

Zywicki: The Economics and Regulation of Network Branded Prepaid Cards

2013]

THE ECONOMICS AND REGULATION OF NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARDS

1507

organizational demands of managing a bank account.184 They also said
that when conflicts arose with the banks over what they believed were
erroneous charges, they “[did] not feel ‘listened to’ or ‘believed’
because of factors such as their lower income, manner of dress or
language.”185 By contrast, they said that the costs associated with check
cashing services and money orders were more transparent and
immediate than those associated with bank accounts. They found access
to those service providers more convenient than access to banks.186
Hispanic consumers said they felt especially unwelcome by banks
because of language barriers, and in some cases Hispanic immigrants
could not open a bank account or cash a check because they lacked
adequate identification.187
Participants in the study also stated that they felt that the costs of
certain inconveniences might be larger and the benefits of a traditional
bank account were smaller.188 For example, because underbanked
consumers live closer to the financial edge, they often feel a need to
access funds immediately rather than waiting through the two- or threeday hold period until a check clears at a bank.189 Thus, they put a
premium on physical control and immediate access to their money.190
The benefits of a bank account may be lower as well. For example,
several participants reported they could not use a check to pay their rent
(their largest bill) but were required to use cash or money order.191
As a result of the higher costs and feelings of distrust about banks,
many unbanked customers implicitly or explicitly forego a bank account
and rely on non-bank alternatives even if they could open a bank
account. In light of the escalating cost of bank accounts on the one hand
and the declining costs of prepaid cards on the other, this decision may
prove rational. Consumers who prefer prepaid cards express several
reasons for using prepaid cards: prepaid cards impose self-control and
typically do not permit overdrafting or paying more than they have;
prepaid cards are less expensive than a checking account; prepaid cards
give consumers privacy requiring less personal information than a
checking account; it is much easier to purchase and load a prepaid card
184. In one case, for example, a young woman reported that her parents helped her open a
checking account but she was unable to manage it and ended up closing the account. Id. at 7.
185. Id. at 6.
186. Id. at 9. For example, many unbanked consumers work hours that make it
inconvenient to bank during traditional banking hours. The paucity of bank branches in lower
income areas may make it inconvenient to go to a bank, see id. at 12, especially if one does not
own a car. See id. at 12.
187. Id. at 6.
188. Id. at 7.
189. Id. at 6, 9.
190. Id. at 8.
191. Id.
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than to open a checking account and make deposits; and they can obtain
a prepaid card without a credit check.192 In addition, some prepaid cards
offer the ability to save money193 and offer rewards.194 Such features
reduce the advantages associated with a traditional bank account, debit
card, or credit card (especially since rewards on debit cards declined
after the imposition of the Durbin Amendment).
3. Self-Control and Budgeting
Prepaid card users, especially those who experienced difficulty with
financial management in the past, also state that prepaid cards help them
control their finances and avoid overdraft fees. The most common
reason (cited by over half of respondents in one survey) is that prepaid
cards prevent them from spending more than they have.195 Although
those who use overdraft protection generally are aware of the cost, there
are some consumers who overdraft their accounts inadvertently and
incur unexpected fees.196 Prepaid cards, by contrast, generally do not
offer overdraft protection or do so only in a limited manner. Prepaid
card companies will usually decline consumers’ transactions if they do
not have sufficient funds to cover the purchase. In some instances,
however, a delay between the initial authorization of a transaction and
its clearing might lead to an overdraft if other transactions occur in the
meantime.197 In addition, prepaid cards offer additional services that
assist consumers in managing their finances, such as providing instant

192. I omitted a discussion of why consumers might prefer to use prepaid cards instead of
checks. Checks are a poor substitute for electronic payments generally, so the more relevant
comparison is between debit cards and prepaid cards.
193. See Gordon, Romich & Waithaka, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
194. The 1-2-3 REWARDS Card, for example, offers rewards that consumers can redeem
for gasoline and groceries. See About the Card, 1-2-3 REWARDS: PREPAID,
http://www.kpfprepaid.com/about-the-card/index.asp (last visited July 22, 2013).
195. CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, supra note 161, at 2 (18.3% of underbanked consumers
preferred prepaid cards to checking accounts); see also BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 163, at 4
(finding that 73% of respondents reported that the aspect they liked most about prepaid cards was that
prepaid cards prevented them from overspending or overdrafting (citing LINKAGE RESEARCH AND
CONSULTING, INC., supra note 41, at 2)); NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, PERSPECTIVES ON PREPAID
CARDS FROM LOW-INCOME HISPANIC TAX FILERS 3 (2011), available at http://www.nclr.org/images/
uploads/publications/perspectives_on_prepaid_cards_ (3).pdf (noting that over 60% of Hispanics and
over 50% of non-Hispanics reported that one of the things that prepaid card users liked most was that
they could spend only the amount of money they had); AITE GRP., supra note 169 (finding that 48% of
debanked consumers stated they “strongly agree” with the statement that prepaid cards are better than a
checking account because of the inability to overdraft).
196. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation of Bank Overdraft Protection,
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141, 1174–75 (2012).
197. Most prepaid cards do not offer overdraft protection. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS,
supra note 55, at 3.
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balance updates by text message.198
4. Access to Electronic Payments and Other Financial Products
Another benefit of network branded prepaid cards is that they are
accepted almost universally and are indistinct in appearance from credit
and debit cards. They carry the logo of one of the major payment
networks (Visa, MasterCard, American Express, and Discover), which
provides a sense of psychological validity for consumers that often feel
excluded from the financial mainstream.199 A substantial number of
prepaid card users pointed to the fact that the cards appeared to be
similar to debit and credit cards as an important feature of prepaid
cards.200
Prepaid cards may also offer a vehicle for credit building if
consumers use them to pay recurring monthly bills and also elect to
report the payments to a credit reporting agency.201 In fact, celebrity
financial advisor Suze Orman developed a new prepaid card that touts a
feature for creating a credit history and improving credit scores.202
Although this feature appears uncommon for prepaid cards today,
consumers indicate they want more cards to add this feature.203
Debit and credit cards also require a credit check before approval,
and some prepaid card users are not approved for debit or credit card
products due to bad credit or negative ChexSystems reports of bounced
checks or closed accounts.204 Thus for those who cannot obtain a debit
198. PEW HEALTH GRP., supra note 39, at 3. NetSpend, for example, allows consumers to
personalize the notifications they receive. See Go Mobile with Anytime Alerts, NETSPEND,
https://www.netspend.com/why_netspend/powerful_tools/anytime_alerts.shtml (last visited July
22, 2013).
199. See Gordon, Romich, & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 12; BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra
note 163, at 4; JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 11 fig. 3.
200. A survey by the National Urban League found 26% of prepaid card customers
reported that one of the things they liked best about prepaid cards was that the prepaid cards
carried the logo of one of the major networks (Visa, MasterCard, American Express, and
Discover). See BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 163, at 4. Javelin’s survey found that nearly
one-third of prepaid card users said that the ability to carry a major brand that would allow
ubiquitous acceptance of prepaid cards would lead them to increase their use of prepaid cards.
JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 7 fig. 3.
201. See CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, THE NONPROFIT’S GUIDE TO PREPAID CARDS 14
(2010), available at http://www.cfsinnovation.com/system/files/CFSI%20Nonprofit%20Guide
%20to%20 Prepaid. pdf.
202. The accuracy of her claim, however, is challenged. See, e.g., Kathy Kristof, Suze
Orman Card: Rip-Off or Righteous?, CBS NEWS (Jan. 16, 2012, 8:38 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505144_162-57359114/suze-orman-card-rip-off-or-righteous.
203. See PEW HEALTH GRP., supra note 39, at 3.
204. ChexSystems is a specialized “private database of consumers who have had deposit
accounts closed while holding a negative balance.” See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 55, at
35 n.31 (citing Big Brother Is Watching, C ONSUMER R EPORTS (2009), available at
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/money/consumer-protection/big-brother-is-watching/overview/
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or credit card because of impaired credit, prepaid cards may be the only
product available for electronic or online payments.
C. Prepaid Cards and the Cash Services Economy for the Unbanked
Many unbanked consumers are unbanked involuntarily.205
Consumers in lower income areas might not enjoy access to a traditional
bank because bank branches are scarce in many of these
neighborhoods.206 As a result, unbanked consumers are more reliant on
cash payments than banked consumers. According to the FDIC’s 2011
survey of unbanked households, 23% of unbanked households used
nonbank providers for products and services such as money orders,
check cashing, or remittances.207 The survey also found a dramatic
growth in the use of prepaid cards by unbanked households in recent
years. Such use rose from 12.2% in 2009 to 17.8% in 2011.208
Other financial options available to unbanked consumers are mostly
limited to check cashing and money orders. Although systematic
empirical research is lacking, it appears as though the costs of check
cashing services and money orders are comparable to and probably
higher than the cost for prepaid cards, especially once the total costs in
terms of time and inconvenience are taken into account.209 According to
a 2006 report by Consumer Federation of America for example, check
cashers on average charged 4.11% to cash a payroll check and 2.44% to
cash a government benefits check.210 Participants in the study by
Gordon, Romich, and Waithaka reported paying as much as $13 per
index. htm).
205. For example, 60% of prepaid card users in the Aite Group study expressed a
preference for using checking accounts rather than prepaid cards, which suggests that prepaid
card users are unbanked involuntarily rather than by choice. See AUFSEESER, supra note 43, at 6.
206. See DEYANIRA DEL RIO, NEIGHBORHOOD ECON. DEV. ADVOCACY PROJECT, PREPAID
CARDS & FINANCIAL SERVICES IN LOW INCOME COMMUNITIES (2011), available at
www.fdic.gov/about/comein/DelRioDec11.pdf.
207. FDIC, 2011 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 6.
208. Id.
209. See SUZANNE MARTINDALE & MICHAEL MCCAULEY, ADDING IT ALL UP: HOW PREPAID
CARD FEES COMPARE TO CHECKING ACCOUNT FEES (Apr. 2011), available at
http://www.defendyourdollars.org/pdf/Adding-It-All-Up.pdf.
210. JEAN ANN FOX & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., CASHED OUT:
CONSUMERS PAY STEEP PREMIUM TO “BANK” AT CHECK CASHING OUTLETS 1–2 (2006), available
at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFA_2006_Check_Cashing_Study111506.pdf.
The
Consumer Federation of America study is the most recent systematic study of check cashing
fees that I located. Nevertheless, those figures appear to be more or less valid today. According
to the website of United Check Cashing the fees range from 1.5% to 5% depending on the state.
See FAQ, UNITED CHECK CASHING, http://www.unitedcheckcashing.com/FAQ.asp (last visited
July 22, 2013). Walmart charges less for both check-cashing services ($3 to $6 per check
cashed) and for prepaid cards (issued for free). Walmart MoneyCenter: Check Cashing,
WALMART, http://www.walmart.com/cp/Check-Cashing/632047 (last visited July 22, 2013).
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check, or $40 to $60 per month, to cash checks.211 Another study
estimated that consumers who use check cashers pay $140 to $720 per
year in fees.212 A recent study by the Bretton Woods economic
consulting group estimates that consumers who switch from cash to
reloadable prepaid cards can save an average of 56% per month by
avoiding check cashing, money orders, and other fees.213 Twenty-seven
percent of respondents to the National Urban League survey stated that
one of the things they liked most about prepaid cards was that using a
prepaid card was cheaper than using a check casher.214 Moreover,
because none of these studies account for the time, inconvenience, and
risk of acquiring cash, these estimates surely underestimate the full
costs of relying on cash.
Cash and money orders offer limited functionality and flexibility for
online shopping and electronic transactions.215 Additionally, consumers
who use check cashers and money orders incur additional transaction
costs, such as the “shoe leather” costs of going from place to place.
Gordon, Romich, and Waithaka’s study participants commented that
“the card keeps them from having to run multiple places to cash a
check, buy money orders, and then deliver payments.”216 Prepaid card
users find this convenience especially valuable for recurrent and
predictable financial obligations, such as rent. Moreover, using direct
deposit can further increase the convenience of prepaid cards relative to
cash alternatives by making money available immediately. Paying a bill
by using a check casher or money order typically incurs a delay in
posting time of 24 to 72 hours as compared to immediate payment by
prepaid card. Consumers can also load prepaid cards conveniently;
according to one study, almost half of all prepaid cardholders used the
most popular method to reload—online.217
Because carrying cash can be dangerous and can raise the risks of
crime and loss, consumers tend to use electronic payments more
211. Gordon, Romich & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 10, 14.
212. BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 20, at 13 (citing study by Chexar Networks, Inc.).
213. Press Release, Network Branded Prepaid Card Association, Reloadable Prepaid Cards
Are Low-Cost Options Compared to Other Financial Tools According to Annual Bretton Woods
Analysis (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.nbpca.org/~/media/680D717219DB40209EE0CAC1EF
6D3079.ashx (citing BRETTON WOODS INC, supra note 163).
214. See BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 163, at 4.
215. Although it is technically possible to shop online using a money order, many major sites
such as Amazon.com do not accept checks or money orders and where money orders are accepted, the
process is highly cumbersome and time consuming. See Help: Payment Methods, AMAZON.COM,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html/ref=hp_513058_lppaymethmore?nodeId
=201132710 (last visited July 22, 2013).
216. Gordon, Romich & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 12; see also FED. RESERVE BANK OF
KAN. CITY, supra note 182, at 9 (describing routines used by unbanked consumers to pay bills
and organize their finances).
217. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 29.
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frequently in high-crime areas.218 The National Urban League survey
found that the second-most common reason for using prepaid cards,
stated by 41% of respondents, is that prepaid cards are safer and easier
to use than carrying cash.219 Over 40% of those in a National Council of
La Raza study also stated that one of the things they liked most about
prepaid cards was not having to carry cash.220 Survey respondents also
indicated that using prepaid cards (like other types of electronic
payments) instead of cash can make it easier to budget and manage
money by creating a transaction history.221
Most fundamental, it is exceedingly difficult to function in the
American economy today without payment cards of some sort.
Activities such as e-commerce, car rentals, and travel all require access
to payment cards. According to the Javelin Strategy and Research study,
56% of unbanked consumers who own prepaid cards use them regularly
for online transactions, compared to 46% of all prepaid card
customers.222 Prepaid cards thus serve an important role for unbanked
and underbanked consumers. According to a 2009 survey of 400
underbanked prepaid card users by the Center for Financial Services
Innovation and the Network Branded Prepaid Card Association, 78% of
respondents said that their cards were very or extremely useful, 74%
said they were very likely or certain to recommend the card to others,
60% used their cards weekly, and 12% used them daily.223
IV. MARKET FAILURE AND REGULATORY RESPONSES
For many consumers, prepaid cards are less expensive and more
functional than other payment alternatives. Their decision to use prepaid
cards is rational and consistent with standard economic analysis.
Nevertheless, some express concern that prepaid cards are unduly
expensive for consumers, especially low-income, less educated, and less
financially experienced consumers. They fear that these consumers may
pay excessively for prepaid cards compared to alternatives. Such
218. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the
Limits of Regulation, 2012 INT’L CENTER FOR L. & ECON. 17 n.57, available at
http://www.laweconcenter.org/images/articles/zywicki_interchange.pdf
(ICLE
Financial
Regulatory Program White Paper Series).
219. See BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 163, at 4. This does not imply that the other
73% thought check cashers were less expensive, just that prepaid card customers chose to use
prepaid cards for reasons other than cost (such as convenience). See id.
220. NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, supra note 195, at 3.
221. See BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 163, at 4; NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, supra
note 195, at 3.
222. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 6.
223. CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, RESULTS OF THE NBPCA/CFSI SURVEY: SATISFACTION
WITH AND USAGE OF PREPAID CARDS 1, 3 (2009), available at http://cfsinnovation.com/system/files/
imported/managed_documents/nbpca_cfsi_final_3_.pdf.
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criticisms produced calls for regulation of the terms and marketing of
prepaid cards. Two rationales support regulatory intervention. First, a
market failure may result from inadequate competition that produces
higher prices and a monopoly power in the market. Second, some argue
that there is a consumer protection problem—that consumers lack
sufficient knowledge or capability to understand the complexity of the
product and the fees associated with it. Either way, some argue that
prepaid cards harm consumers with higher prices and lower quality.224
Economic theory and available evidence to date, however, fail to
support either of these rationales for regulatory intervention. Nor is
there any reason to believe that legislators could fashion government
regulation in such a manner to improve market outcomes. On the other
hand, although there is little basis for remedial intervention in the name
of competition or consumer protection, legislators might consider more
modest market-reinforcing interventions that could proactively promote
future competition and consumer protection rather than displace it with
regulation.
A. Competitive Failure?
The first potential rationale for regulation is the existence of a
competitive failure that intervention could remedy. But the prepaid card
market appears exceedingly competitive and barriers to entry are low.
New cards enter the market frequently, including cards provided by
traditional financial service providers such as American Express and
major banks, celebrity-branded cards, and cards aimed at particular
demographic groups.225 A company need not be a bank in order to enter
the prepaid card market because prepaid cards are marketed to
consumers through program officers. The program officers serve as the
“front man” branding the cards and offering much of the day-to-day
operational support for cards while partnering with a network and bank
processor in the back office. For example, the two largest prepaid card
providers—NetSpend and Green Dot—were not banks when they
attained their leadership positions in the market.226 Barriers to entry in
the banking industry, by contrast, are high.
There are other indicators of thriving competition in the prepaid card
industry. Many of the new cards feature low and simplified fee
224. See supra notes 54–75 and accompanying text.
225. See Andrew R. Johnson, Flood of Competition Weighs on Prepaid-Card Companies,
FOX BUSINESS, July 27, 2010, http://markets.m.foxbusiness.com/quickPage.html?page=32642&
content=77126749&pageNum=-1; Susan Johnston, The Pitfalls of Celebrity-Branded Cards,
MINT.COM (Jan. 3, 2011) http://www.mint.com/blog/trends/celebrity-prepaid-cards-01032011.
226. Green Dot subsequently did acquire a bank but it was not necessary to conduct its
business. Green Dot Buying Small Utah Bank, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 23, 2011,
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9R6MI0G0.htm.
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structures and the number of fees is steadily declining over time.227
Especially for lower income consumers, the total price of holding and
using prepaid cards fell in recent years even as the cost of traditional
bank accounts trended up.228 The quality of prepaid cards also rose as
prices fell in the wake of heightened competition.229 Prepaid cards now
include new features such as linked savings accounts; web, text, and
email alerts; electronic statements; and mobile banking.230
Striking features of the prepaid card industry are the ease by which
consumers can switch cards and the fierce competitive efforts
companies exert to attract new customers. Switching debit cards usually
entails switching bank accounts, which can prove a difficult and tedious
process, especially for lower income consumers who may suffer from
blemished financial records. Switching credit cards can also prove
difficult for those with impaired credit because they may not receive
approval for a new credit card. Prepaid cards, by contrast, generally
require no credit check, and feature minimal transaction costs when
switching from one prepaid card to another. Indeed, a consumer can
even transfer funds easily from one prepaid card to a new one
electronically.
Data from the Federal Reserve also indicate the ease with which
consumers can switch prepaid cards compared to alternatives.231 For
example, in 2009 only 9% of consumers discarded one or more of their
debit cards and 16.5% discarded one or more credit card.232 By contrast,
29% of consumers discarded at least one prepaid card.233 There is little
reason to believe that there is a competitive market failure in the prepaid
card market given the ease with which consumers can switch loyalties
and obtain new prepaid cards, the rivalry from other forms of electronic
payments such as debit and credit cards, and the ease of entry and
strong competition to attract new customers. As noted, in contrast to the
media’s and regulators’ criticism of prepaid cards, prepaid card
customers generally express high levels of satisfaction with their cards

227. See discussion supra notes 56–70 and accompanying text.
228. BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 163, at 10; see PHILIP KEITEL, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
PHILA., FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE PREPAID CARD INDUSTRY: COSTS, BENEFITS, AND CHANGING
INDUSTRY DYNAMICS 18–19 (2010), available at http://www.philadelphia fed.org/consumer-credit-andpayments/payment-cards-center/events/conferences/2011/C2011-Federal-Regulation-of-Prepaid-CardIndustry.pdf (conference summary describing comments of Green Dot’s Steve Streit and MetaBank’s
Brad Hanson).
229. See KEITEL, supra note 228, at 18.
230. See Go Mobile with Anytime Alerts, supra note 198; Out of 82 Prepaid Debit Cards,
Find the One for You, supra note 107.
231. See Foster et al., supra note 24, at 45–46.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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that are consistent with the hypothesis that the market is competitive.234
Moreover, although issuer revenues have grown as the market has
grown, there is no evidence that prepaid card issuers are earning
sustainable economic profits or “rents” from their operations. In fact,
despite growing revenues, the stocks of the industry’s largest players
(NetSpend and Green Dot) sagged as a result of heightened entry and
competition.235
B. Consumer Protection Rationales: Do Prepaid Card Users
Understand What They Are Doing?
A market failure might support government intervention if
consumers either lack an accurate understanding of the full cost of
prepaid cards (compared to relevant alternatives) or are unable to easily
compare offers from competing prepaid card issuers. In such a case,
regulators could justify intervention if they reduced fees or required the
disclosure of certain terms or fees.236
Based on available information, however, prepaid card customers
appear to have an accurate sense of the cards’ cost. Indeed, the fee
structure of prepaid cards does not seem any more complicated than
those for credit cards or checking accounts. And, as noted, many
consumers who use prepaid cards do so precisely because these cards
are less complicated than the myriad fees and rules associated with
checking accounts or credit cards. Almost three-quarters of prepaid card
users in a 2009 survey said the fees for using their cards were fair, and
an even greater number said they understood the fees well.237 Interviews
by Gordon, Romich, and Waithaka revealed that consumers found the
fee structures of prepaid cards transparent and easy to understand, that
they had knowledge of the fees for their transactions, and that there
were not unexpected fees.238 They also thought the fees charged were
fair.239 This sentiment is echoed anecdotally in the Pew Focus Group
study, as one participant commented:
I think [prepaid card fees] are fair because they’re upfront.
I’m thinking in contrast to a checking account . . . [where]
they’re going to whammy you with fees on the backside.
Whereas [with] prepaid debit cards, they’re very upfront.
234. See discussion supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
235. See Johnson, supra note 225. In fact, to the extent that any barrier to entry exists, the
barrier is one of the perverse effects of the Durbin Amendment that chilled entry into the market
by larger banks. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
236. This assumes, of course, that any such intervention is well-tailored to address and
correct the identified problem.
237. CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, supra note 195, at 5.
238. Gordon, Romich & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 13.
239. Id. at 14.
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This is the cost of the card; this is the cost for the services.
It’s up to you at that point.240
Moreover, consumers who use prepaid cards state that they
understand the kind and amount of fees on prepaid cards better than
they do for debit or credit cards.241 Indeed, despite the various fees on
prepaid cards, the number of potential fees on checking accounts and
credit cards is even larger.242 Consumers’ confusion and lack of
comprehension about the terms and fees of bank accounts is what led
many of them to reject the traditional banking system in favor of the
simpler and more transparent pricing scheme of prepaid cards.243
Prepaid card users also appear to have an accurate sense of which fee
combinations are most suitable for their particular situations. NetSpend,
for example, offers two different payment plans: one with a monthly fee
and free POS transactions (plus a few other à la carte fees) and another
plan that charges no monthly fee but charges a per-transaction fee
instead.244 Seventy-four percent of NetSpend’s customers choose the
per-transaction plan rather than the monthly-fee plan.245 According to
data provided to the author by NetSpend, its customers overwhelmingly
choose the correct card and adjust their choices over time to correct any
errors. Seventy-four percent of NetSpend’s customers choose the leastexpensive fee plan for their card usage.246 Five percent pay monthly but
do not use the card frequently enough to justify the flat fee, and 21%
pay on a per-transaction basis but use the card enough to warrant
selecting the monthly fee plan.247 Users select a card plan at the time of
activation, but about 11% switch from one plan to another during their
tenure. In addition, NetSpend says that it has a proactive outreach
program to inform customers of less expensive options.248 Thus, an
overwhelming number choose the right plan for their usage patterns and
can easily switch to another plan or another card issuer if they make
240. PEW HEALTH GRP., supra note 39, at 1.
241. See supra notes 238–40 and accompanying text.
242. PEW HEALTH GRP., supra note 39, at 1.
243. See Gordon, Romich & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 13.
244. E-mail from Lisa Henken, Netspend, to Todd J. Zywicki, Professor of Law, George
Mason Univ. Sch. of Law (Apr. 17, 2012, 11:33 PM EST) (on file with author).
245. E-mail from Lisa Henken, Netspend, to Todd J. Zywicki, Professor of Law, George
Mason Univ. Sch. of Law (Apr. 30, 2012, 4:18 PM EST) (on file with author).
246. E-mail from Lisa Henken, supra note 244.
247. Id. Note that the asymmetric distribution of errors toward the no monthly fee card
could result from a variety of sources: an underestimation of the expected frequency of card
usage, liquidity constraints that might make the monthly fee more burdensome for some
customers, or an endogeneity effect where consumers who elect the monthly fee card then
proceed to use it more.
248. Id. By phone and through the website and when a customer calls in with a customer
service question, the representative can review the customer’s account and suggest changes.
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mistakes. As a result, if regulation foreclosed options for consumers—
such as the proposed Menendez legislation (described in Part II) that
would prohibit cards with per-transaction fee pricing—hundreds of
thousands would pay higher fees or possibly abandon prepaid cards
completely.
C. Market-Reinforcing Regulation
Although advocates of intervention abstractly criticize prepaid cards
and allege that consumers do not understand the cost and fee structure
of prepaid cards, or that the price of prepaid cards is simply “too high”
in some absolute sense, they provide no tangible evidence that this is
actually the case. Thus, even while deep regulatory intervention is
unwarranted, regulators should consider milder, market-reinforcing
regulation that promotes more robust competition and consumer choice
in the market.
In fact, the biggest single obstacle to increased competition and
consumer welfare today is not any failure of competition, but rather the
Durbin Amendment. And the single most effective step that could
benefit consumers and promote market competition is to repeal the
Durbin Amendment, allow market forces to set interchange fees, and
allow debit and prepaid cards to compete on a level playing field. Large
banks have the potential to place tremendous competitive pressure on
incumbents in the prepaid card industry through the particular mix of
low card fees and features that they can provide (such as branches and
in-network ATMs). In addition, large banks appear uniquely positioned
to develop prepaid cards that function either as alternatives to bank
accounts or as bridges from prepaid cards to bank accounts and other
traditional banking services. The Durbin Amendment chills this
competitive pressure by forcing large banks to choose between either
offering cards with reduced functionality and features or exposing their
cards to the Durbin Amendment’s interchange fee price controls (which,
if applicable, would force large issuers to raise other fees or reduce
services).249 This arbitrary restraint on competition is harmful to
consumers.
Another area where government intervention may be appropriate
relates to the pass-through of FDIC insurance on customer account
balances in the event the prepaid card issuer fails.250 Most prepaid cards
are issued by a program manager (such as NetSpend) that collects the
customer’s money and then, for administrative purposes, deposits the
money in a pooled account. The account is held in the name of the
249. See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
250. For a brief explanation, see Prepaid Cards & Deposit Insurance, NETWORK BRANDED
PREPAID CARD ASSOCIATION, http://www.nbpca.com/en/Government-Affairs/Policy-Positions/DepositInsurance. aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
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program manager. Once the funds are pooled, the total amount in the
program manager’s account easily exceeds the $250,000 limit for FDIC
insurance.251 In theory, this arrangement could provide insecurity for
customers’ funds. In practice, however, the FDIC issues guidance to
banks on how to preserve FDIC pass-through insurance on individual
cardholders’ accounts.252 Thus, it appears that every prepaid card
backed by a bank—which apparently includes every major prepaid card
in the market today except for those issued by American Express253—
provides FDIC pass-through insurance for its customers.254 According
to the Pew Study, more than 90% of the prepaid card programs in the
study offered FDIC deposit insurance pass-through.255 Most consumers
believed that their deposits were insured.256 In practice, the lack of
FDIC pass-through appears more of a theoretical problem than a real
problem. This suggests that both the benefits and costs of mandating
FDIC pass-through are likely small.
Some uncertainty also exists about consumer protection from fraud
or unauthorized use of prepaid cards. Fraud protection for prepaid cards
is not required by the Electronic Funds Transfer Act. The CFPB issued
an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the question of whether
to extend Regulation E to prepaid cards.257 Nevertheless, all of the
prepaid cards Pew studied offered some type of contractual protection
251. Id.
252. See Insurability of Funds Underlying Stored Value Cards and Other Nontraditional
Access Mechanisms, 73 Fed. Reg. 67155, 67156 (Nov. 13, 2008) (describing the process for
providing deposit insurance for prepaid cards).
253. American Express cards are not FDIC insured because American Express is not a bank
and pools its customers’ accounts rather than segregating them. See More about the Amex Prepaid
Card, BANKTALK (June 24, 2011), http://banktalk.org/2011/06/24/more-about-the-amex-prepaidcard. The funds on American Express cards are protected by state transmitter laws. See CONSUMER
ACTION, PREPAID CREDIT CARD SURVEY: 2012, at 15 (2012), available at http://www.consumeraction.org/ downloads/press/2012_Prepaid_Card_Survey.pdf; Money Services Business Disclosures,
AMERICAN EXPRESS, https://www.americanexpress.com/us/content/prepaid/state-licensing.
html?vgnextchannel=95ddb81e8482a110VgnVCM100000defaad94RCRD&appinstancename=defa
ult (last visited July 22, 2013).
254. See CONSUMER ACTION, supra note 253, at 3–4. The universality of providing FDIC
pass-through insurance is driven in part by a requirement that any bank that provides clearance
services for federal government benefit cards must comply with FDIC regulations in order to
offer FDIC pass-through insurance. See Federal Government Participation in the Automated
Clearing House, 31 C.F.R. § 210 (2010), available at http://www.fms.treas.gov/ach/31cfr210_i
nt_final.pdf. Once established, the same mechanisms used for federal government programs
apply to private prepaid cards as well.
255. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 55, at 4. Only 3 of 52 card programs expressly
stated that they did not offer FDIC pass-through, 23 claimed to offer pass-through, and 26
featured disclosures. Id. at 10.
256. Id. at 4, 10.
257. Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 30,923 (proposed May 24,
2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005).
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for unauthorized transfers.258 Pew claims these contractual protections
generally are not as “favorable as the protections that are guaranteed to
checking account holders by EFTA” and are contractual provisions
subject to revision at any time.259 In practice, however, issuing networks
offer fraud protection on prepaid cards similar to that offered on debit
cards. As one commentator observed, “Although issuing banks are not
mandated to offer this protection on prepaid cards, competition in the
industry has led to many prepaid cards with liability protection.”260
Thus, again, both the benefits and costs of extending Regulation E
protection to prepaid cards are relatively small. On the other hand,
certain features of Regulation E, such as the period of time during
which a bank can hold a suspicious charge and the requirement that
banks issue periodic statements to customers, may not suit prepaid cards
due to the heightened potential for fraud. Also, the “transient” nature of
prepaid card customers makes recovery difficult in the event that an
issuer later wins a dispute over a charge.261
Some also propose that the industry adopt a standardized format for
disclosure of prepaid card fees modeled after the “Schumer box” for
credit cards.262 Pew’s analysis found that card fee disclosure was often
incomplete and it was often difficult to ascertain whether a card had a
certain fee.263 Although most prepaid card customers state that they
understand their card fees, the National Urban League found that 24%
of survey respondents did not understand all of the card fees when they
acquired their cards and that 23% claimed they were charged an
unexpected fee. This pattern suggests room for improving disclosures to
assist consumer understanding and comparison shopping.264 These
remaining problems may prove self-correcting as a result of the trend
258. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 55, at 20.
259. Id.
260. Douglas A. King, Dispelling Prepaid Card Myths: Not All Cards Are Created Equal,
FED. RESERVE BANK ATLANTA (July 5, 2011), http://portalsandrails.frbatlanta.org/2011/
07/dispelling-prepaid-card-myths-not-all-cards-created-equal.html.
261. For discussion, see Letter from Mary Mitchell Dunn, Senior Vice President and
Deputy General Counsel, Credit Union Nat’l Ass’n, to Monica Jackson, Office of the Executive
Secretary, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau (July 23, 2012), available at http://www.cuna.org/
download/cl_072312.pdf (regarding the notice of proposed rulemaking for electronic fund
transfers).
262. See DAVID NEWVILLE, CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, THINKING INSIDE THE BOX:
IMPROVING CONSUMER OUTCOMES THROUGH BETTER FEE DISCLOSURE FOR PREPAID CARDS 4, 7
(2012), available at http://cfsinnovation.com/system/files/CFSI_Prepaid%20Cards%20White
paper%20FInal_0.pdf.
263. For example, Pew found that 30 cards disclosed a fee to speak to a live customer
service representative, 11 disclosed it as free, and 11 cards did not disclose whether there was a
fee to speak to a customer service representative. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 55,
at 3.
264. See LINKAGE RESEARCH CONSULTING, INC., supra note 41, at 2.
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toward eliminating fees and as a result of consumers gaining experience
with the product.
A standardized disclosure format could prove useful to consumers
and to the competitive process because it would enable consumers to
easily find the card that is most appropriate for their purposes.
Regulators must ensure that the information is provided in a userfriendly way and that the fees that require disclosure in the standardized
format are relevant to consumers. Regulators should also subject
disclosures to periodic review and updates in light of product
innovations and changing consumer preferences. In addition, regulators
should copy test any mandated disclosures and ensure they improve
consumer comprehension and decision making.
CONCLUSION
Network branded prepaid cards have emerged as an important and
rapidly growing sector of the retail consumer banking system. The
regulatory onslaught of the past several years increased demand for
prepaid cards as regulation raised the costs of and reduced access to
debit and credit cards especially among lower income and younger
consumers. At the same time, the need for access to electronic payments
increased.
Prepaid cards crept toward the mainstream of the consumer
payments market, and now spur greater competition and produce higher
quality and lower cost for customers—a dramatic contrast from the
rising price of traditional bank accounts. Although prepaid cards may
seem expensive, those who use them appear to do so rationally. To date,
scholars and regulators cannot identify a cognizable market failure or
failure of consumer protection that justifies remedial governmental
intervention.
Given the regulatory havoc wreaked on the debit and credit card
systems during the past several years, prepaid cards are increasingly
becoming a final resort for many consumers who are unable to gain
other access to the functionality of electronic payments. In light of this
reality, regulators should move exceedingly cautiously before taking
steps that could critically harm the dynamic and evolving prepaid card
market that provides value and choice to millions of Americans.
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